"So Here is a Nice Mess:" The Navy Shells Wagner and Sumter from Land and Sea at Charleston



This watercolor, titled "View of Charleston Harbor and its Defenses," shows the Navy and Army siege lines
on Morris Island.  The Navy Battery is on the left and the ironclads can be seen on the far right.

Having failed to take Fort Wagner by direct assault, Brigadier General Quincy Gilmore elected to start a formal siege operation against Confederate defenses. His plan was to blast the Confederate out of their positions in a similar manner to siege operations conducted against Vicksburg and Port Hudson. He also expanded the target list to include Fort Sumter. The problem Gilmore faced was the same problem faced by Union ground forces out West: a lack of heavy guns.  Like the sieges of Port Hudson and Vicksburg, the Navy came to the Army's aid.

Rear Admiral John Dahlgren furnished the necessary resources. He provided two English-made 70-pounder Whitworth Rifles (captured from a blockade runner), two 200-pounder Parrott Rifles, and five 100-pounder Parrott Rifles. In addition, sailors and soldiers dragged ten mortars into position (an excellent discussion on the Naval battery's particular guns and the batteries can be found at Craig Swain's "Marker Hunter" blog).

Navy gun crews with the Whitworth Rifles

Dahlgren assigned Commander Foxhall Parker, Jr. to oversee the newly designated "Naval Battery" and "Naval Brigade." Parker served as Dahlgren's adjutant for the squadron aboard USS Wabash and gave the commander leeway in finding the necessary sailors and marines to man and protect the guns. In a major concession to Army-Navy cooperation, naval units on shore fell under Gilmore's command.

This is not to say Dahlgren and his ships would stand idly by. The admiral assigned two monitors, Passaic and Patapsco, to take aim at Fort Sumter from 2,000 yards out. Four other Union monitors (Weehawken, Catskill, Montauk, and Nahant) took aim at Fort Wagner, with New Ironsides and several wooden gunboats in reserve.

Harper's Weekly's Theodore Davis' interpretation of
the Navy Battery firing at Fort Sumter. 

The bombardment from land and sea on Forts Wagner and Sumter began on August 17th and last through the 24th. Dahlgren and Gilmore were cordial during the first four days of the bombardment. Things went a little sour on the 21st when Gilmore asked the monitors to suppress Wagner's sharpshooters.  Dahglren frequently stated to Gilmore that he could have the monitors at any time.  In this case, however, Dahlgren explained the finer points of tides and currents to the general and concluded that his ships could not simply charge in whenever needed.

Dahlgren's sketch of the position of his ironclads during the August
17th bombardment of Fort Wagner and Battery Gregg.

Surprisingly, Gilmore was not offended.  He changed his tune when he asked Dahlgren to leave Wagner alone, and go all in with all his ironclads at Fort Sumter at close range. Once again, Dahlgren hesitated and explained the difficulties of attacking Sumter, namely the shallow waters around the fort. He finally decided on releasing two monitors, Passasic and Weehawken, to assault Sumter at close range. Both monitors ran aground during their attack.

But, Gilmore would change his mind several times about where he wanted the Navy's resources. Though Army-Navy cooperation had improved since Du Pont left, Dahlgren expressed major frustrations with his Army counterpart. It seemed that every time Dahlgren prepared to send his monitors at Sumter, Confederate sharpshooters from Fort Wagner would take aim at Gilmore's sappers.  Angered, Gilmore would demand the monitors to return. One telegram provided proof of Dahlgren's frustration. Gilmore signaled Dahlgren during the operation to "Send [the monitors] back, they are inspecting us with their spyglasses."

The end result of the seven day bombardment looked impressive. Several sections of the brick and mortar of Fort Sumter were smashed. Yet Sumter and Wagner remained in control of their respective garrisons. Dahlgren recalled several monitors for repairs caused by Confederate guns. The Catskill in particular took several critical hits. Wagner's guns struck Catskill seven times near the pilot house, which resulted in her commanding officer Commander George Rogers' death. In his final report on the operation to Secretary Welles, Dahlgren believed that he did not have enough ironclads to attack Sumter, suppress Wagner's guns, and perform other duties in Georgia. Thus, the operation ended in failure.

The Naval Battery recorded mixed results as well. Parker reported that his four gun battery fired 703 Parrott shells, 373 of which struck Sumter.  Over two hounded solid shots came from the Whitworth rifles. More shots would have come from the Whitworths if it wasn't for one that exploded, killing four sailors. A shell exploded after it became jammed half into the barrel. Sailors attempted to ram the shot further into the gun.

When Dahlgren heard that Passaic ran aground, he wrote in his diary, "So here is a nice mess."  It should have been his final conclusion for this particular operation.

Siege of Charleston: Supporting the Charge of the 54th Massachusetts Volunteers

The Assault on Fort Wagner as published in 1890.
This interpretation of the famous charge of the 54th Massachusetts is
 one  of the  few that show the U.S. Navy's ironclads in action.

Amidst siege operations in Charleston,Union leadership decided to try and seize Fort Wagner. The fort commanded the southern approaches to Charleston Harbor. It was relatively isolated from other Confederate fortifications.  Thus, it could not count on help if attacked. 

Map of Morris Island and Fort Wagner

Rear Admiral John Dahlgren, commanding the South Atlantic Blockading Squadron, and Brigadier General Quincy Gilmore, commanding Union ground forces, agreed on a plan.  They planned to first seize the southern shores of Morris Island before beginning an assault on Fort Wagner on July 11.  The first part of the plan worked well.  A combination of four monitors (USS Weehawken, Nahant, Catskill, and Montauk), wooden gunboats, and small boats from the steam frigate USS Wabash equipped with boat howitzers, provided sufficient cover for a Union landing to overrun Confederate defenses. 

The monitors shelled Confederate positions from 4 a.m. until 12 p.m..  They then withdrew back out into open water "for lunch" promptly at noon.  Two hours later, the monitors resumed their firing positions. 

This assault on Fort Wagner itself did not succeed due to accurate heavy gun fire from Confederate gunners.  The Confederate gunners even damaged some of the monitors with a bolt type, armor-piercing shot. Union forces managed to establish a siege line during the melee. Gilmore planned a second assault on Wagner with five regiments.  The African American-manned 54th Massachusetts Volunteers lead the attack.

For the Navy's part, Dahlgren prepared six ironclads to support the operation.  The Federal force included the four monitors previously mentioned, plus USS New Ironsides, the monitor USS Patapsco, and three wooden gunboats. The steam sloop USS Housantonic stood back to observe where the ironclads' shots landed and to signal each ship the results. Additionally, Dahlgren put New Ironsides' Marines on alert, just in case they were needed in the ground assault.
  


Alfred Waud's drawing of USS Patapsco
 and other monitors off of Charleston.


The Navy bombardment began in the morning, with the squadron firing from 1,200 yards. Taking advantage of the flood tide, the ironclads moved west of the Main Ship Channel and closer to the fort.  At three hundred yards, the ironclads began a rapid fire bombardment.  Unlike the July 11 attack, the Navy's shelling kept the Confederate gunners from returning fire.

The ships kept up the fire until 7.30 p.m.  Gilmore signaled to Dahlgren that his troops were in position to assault.  Dahlgren ordered a cease fire due to a lack of light and a fear of hitting Union ground forces. The admiral reported that he witnessed flashes of gunfire from the ground assault until 9:30 p.m. Dahlgren wrote that the "ill-tiding of a repulse were not long in coming."  He received official word at 10:30 p.m. 

Supporting the second assault, the Navy unloaded about 1,945 shells (mostly XI-inch shells, but also some XV-inch shells, 150-pound and 100-pounder rifle shells) on Fort Wagner.  The number is a bit misleading, as New Ironsides accounted for 1,120 of them, the wooden gunboats 200, and the monitors about 625.  The broadside ironclad out-fired all the monitors combined.  In all, the squadron fired 432,676 lbs, or a little over 216 tons, of ordnance at Fort Wagner. During the bombardment, a disturbing trend arose.  Critical breaches occurred on three of the squadron's Parrot Rifles.

Dahlgren concluded that the plan was sound, but more troops were needed for the ground assault.  Additionally, he held high praise for the Army's assault.  He wrote, "the loss sustained by our troops bears witness to the preserving gallantry with which they endeavored to storm the work, and which deserve, I trust, a renewed effort."