Saturday, April 19, 2014

Navy 'Changed Trajectory of the War'

1862 illustration shows captured British blockade runners. (U.S. Navy)
The Navy "changed the trajectory of the war" was the way one of the nation's leading historians described the service's contribution to the ultimate Union victory in 1865.

Speaking April 16 at the United States Naval Institute's annual meeting in Washington, Dr. Craig Symonds, co-winner of the 2009 Lincoln Prize for his Lincoln and His Admirals, said the blockade of Confederate ports from the Carolinas on the Atlantic to the Texas Gulf Coast "was the largest enterprise the Navy undertook," ultimately involving more than 500 ships, more than 400 of them converted merchantmen -- "the last time that was still possible," and 100,000 men.

The Union Navy transformed itself from a fleet of 42 ships scattered around the globe or in ordinary at shipyards with a few thousand officers and experienced tars in 1861 to a technologically adept force with rifled guns, iron-plated, screw propellers, etc. operating with a "changed lower deck" of "volunteers. contrabands from the South, free blacks from the North" in 1865.

When President Abraham Lincoln announced the blockade, Symonds, a professor emeritus of history at the Naval Academy, contends that he and Secretary of State William Seward understood that it "was an act of war" and implied "a kind of recognition" of the Confederacy.

But it proved hugely advantageous for the Union.  Great Britain. while acknowledging the Confederacy as a belligerent, declared itself neutral in the North American war and by doing that effectively closed off its ports, particularly important in the Caribbean, to Confederate privateers or later its commerce raiders trying to sell off their captured "prizes."

But the reality of blockade is actually far more difficult than simply declaring it.  "You actually have to do it" over 3,500 miles of coast with 189 harbors and navigable inlets. "Maintaining it was hard work.  Blockade service [meant] days that were long and tedious ... in all weather.  Usually at night and often in rain or drizzle, the blockade runners were creeping in and out of Southern ports.

It did work on a number of levels, Symonds said, including persuading a large number of foreign ship-owners never to risk their vessels in a race for safety and riches in a Confederate harbor. The blockade caused "the slow asphyxiation" of the rebellion and "very likely made the war shorter."

With the profit motive of privateering proving to be a myth, the Confederacy turned to buying ships overseas for commerce raiding.  Led by James D. Bulloch, a onetime officer in the United States Navy and experienced merchant marine officer, the Jefferson Davis government put to sea a "dozen or so" of these ships, most notably Alabama that destroyed 284 American merchantmen over the course of the war. 

Indeed, the Confederate Navy's Civil War didn't end until November 1865 when Shenandoah returned to Liverpool, having destroyed a number of American whalers operating in the Pacific -- after Robert E. Lee's surrender at Appomattox.

The commerce raiders were an interesting story all their own.  They were officered by Confederates, but the overwhelming majority of the crew were British, Scot, Irish and French "who didn't think much" of promises of future fortunes for all when the Union threw in the towel.  "They were in it for the money" immediately. When the prize money remained empty promises and the risks great, many deserted.

Commerce raiding "was a great idea for the Confederacy" because it caused maritime insurance rates to skyrocket and caused American-flagged vessels to change registry  to avoid destruction.

But in the end, the commerce raiders "did not bring Lincoln to the negotiating table" nor did they weaken the blockade.

For the greater part of the war, the Army and Navy operated separately even when fighting in the same area. Think New Orleans; think Charleston.  Yet from the war's start on the  rivers lying west of the Appalachians to the Mississippi, combined operations proved very successful at Forts Henry and Donelson and Island Number 10 -- keeping Kentucky in the Union and splintering Tennessee. Joint operations also set the stage for Maj. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant to take his army from positions west of Vicksburg, Miss., where it had been stymied for months  to crossing the river and laying a siege that closed off any escape to the east by large numbers of Confederate soldiers now trapped in the river city.

Effective but time-consuming.

More dramatically, at New Orleans, then Capt. David Glasgow Farragut didn't wait for the Army and blasted his way past the forts below the Confederacy's largest city and most important trading port to capture the city with ocean-going frigates in the spring of 1862.

Official Washington loved that dash and rewarded Farragut with promotion.  The Navy Department wanted more of it. Its leadership thought it had just the man, Capt. Samuel F. DuPont, who had captured Port Royal, S.C., and turned it into the base for the Atlantic blockade. And, more to the point, he would have ironclads. 

At Charleston, DuPont certainly felt the heat from Assistant Navy Secretary Gustavus Fox and to a lesser extent from Navy Secretary Gideon Welles to keep his attack on the birthplace of secession an "all Navy affair." The "attack." in spring 1863" was a disaster.  The invincible ironclads of Fox's and Welles' dreams were ineffective, at best.
Mine and obstacles channeled the vessels into deadly fields of fire from artillery ashore and in the island forts.  The ironclads minus disabled Keokuk   had no choice but to retreat to safety.  Keokuk eventually sank off Morris Island. In fact, Charleston remained in Confederate hands until the last few weeks of the war when i

Sunday, April 6, 2014

Sinking of the Union transport steamer Maple Leaf

Alfred Waud sketch of torpedoed Union Steamers Maple Leaf and General Hunter on the St. Johns River, Florida. Source:  Library of Congress Civil War photo archives.

While Union Navy gunboats patrolled the St. Johns River in Florida, the Union Army largely got around Florida by leasing civilian steamers to transport their men, animals and equipment on the rivers and coastal waters. The U.S. Steamer Maple Leaf was leased by the Army in 1862. A sidewheel steamer built in Canada to transport people and freight, she headed south from Boston for service on the St. Johns River in Florida.
In March 1864, Confederate General P.G.T. Beauregard, in charge of the coastal defenses of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida, ordered Lt. Col. M.B. Harris  to Florida to plant torpedoes (what today we call mines) in the St. Johns River to try to deter Union military activities, which were growing increasingly common on the river. He was assisted by Capt. E.P. Bryan, already in Florida.
In late March, the Maple Leaf landed troops and supplies at Jacksonville, then took aboard a group of cavalry and headed upriver, where she landed them at Palatka. She departed to return to Jacksonville the evening of 31 March. Early on the morning of 1 April, the steamer struck one of 12 torpedoes placed near Mandarin Point by Harris and Bryan a couple days earlier. The steamer went down quickly, with four crewmen killed. Sixty three other passengers, including some civilians and women, evacuated from the steamer and made their way to Jacksonville in the ship’s boats. In addition to the loss of lives, the steamer also went down with most of the personal effects of three U.S. Army regiments, the 112th New York, 169th New York, and 13th Indiana.

Jacksonville dentist Dr. Keith Holland, born and raised in the city, always had an avid interest in the history of the Jacksonville area and the St. Johns River. He became particularly interested in the story of the Maple Leaf and in his spare time, researched the details of the sinking of the steamer (which included trips to Washington D.C). After much research, in June 1984 Keith and colleagues discovered what they were sure was the wreck of the Maple Leaf in the river bottom off Mandarin Point. Much of the wreck was buried under river sediment, and after obtaining some funding, and dealing with numerous permitting and legal issues, they began to excavate the wreck, which confirmed its identity as the Maple Leaf. Notably, their interest was not profit; nothing they brought up from the wreck was sold for personal gain. All material they recovered was turned over to the State of Florida after careful preservation work.

The wreck of the Maple Leaf turned out to be an immense treasure trove of artifacts and material detailing the personal lives of Civil War Army personnel. The material recovered from the wreck includes military equipage (weapons, uniform buttons, other gear), personal effects (smoking pipes, personal grooming and other items, bottles and flasks of various types), and items plundered from raids on southern plantations (fine china, silverware, etc.). Even “organic” items such as leather, paper, etc. have been recovered. The anaerobic (=no oxygen) conditions of the St. Johns River bottom was an ideal environment for the preservation of the artifacts. National Park Service historian Dr. Ed Bearss has noted, “The wreck of the Maple Leaf is unsurpassed as a source for Civil War material culture.    . . . It is the most important repository of Civil War artifacts every found, and probably will remain so.”

Many of the artifacts recovered from the wreck are archived in the Florida Museum of History in Tallahassee, but some of the artifacts, and a nice model and paintings of the Maple Leaf, are on display at the Mandarin Museum in south Jacksonville (website below). On April 4-5, the museum opened a special exhibit to observe the 150th Anniversary of the sinking of the transport. They also had Union and Confederate living history displays on the museum grounds for folks to learn about the lifestyles of these folks during the war. Contributing blogger Seaman Rob was there with his Navy camp and display to help educate folks about the role of the USN on the St. Johns River during the war.

Living history displays at the April 4-5 commemoration of the Maple Leaf. Small Navy camp in foreground; note hammock slung beneath the lean-to. Author's photo.
 The Mandarin Museum web site:

Maple Leaf shipwreck web site:

Thursday, March 6, 2014

March 6, 1864: Failed torpedo-boat attack on USS Memphis

The success of the H.L. Hunley on February 17, 1864, even if qualified by the loss of the submarine, gave reason for Confederate authorities at Charleston to attempt more torpedo-craft attacks. The next attempt was not in front of Charleston harbor, but rather to the southwest on the North Edisto River.


Federals had not placed obstructions or taken other measures, as done on the Stono River, to deter Confederate attacks. And the USS Memphis, a former blockade runner herself, operated in the North Edisto. Acting Master Robert O. Patterson commanded the Memphis.

With the Hunley gone, the Confederates employed the CSS David torpedo-boat. The David employed a spar torpedo much like that successfully used on the Hunley. But the David could not submerge, and relied on a low profile to avoid detection during an attack.

In late February the David transited the backwaters to reach Church Flats. On the night of March 4, First Assistant Engineer James H. Tomb skippered the David downriver to within sight of the Memphis. But the torpedo-boat's pumps failed and Tomb abandoned the attack. The following night, Tomb again moved the David downriver. And again the pumps failed. But this time the crew managed to resolve the problem. Tomb then proceeded to attack the Memphis:
About 12:30 a.m. [March 6], as we came within hailing distance, they hailed us, but we paid no attention to their hail, and the next moment they opened on us with small arms, the shot striking the steel cover did no harm. The next moment the "David" struck her on the port quarter about 8 feet below the surface. The blow was a good one, but the torpedo failed to explode.
Patterson reported his men first hailed the David around 1 a.m. as it approached, at a distance of fifty yards.
We immediately beat to quarters and slipped the chain; in an instant the torpedo was under our port quarter, and we could not bring a gun to bear on her. The watch being armed at the time, we were enabled to concentrate a rapid fire with muskets, revolvers, and pistols drawn up on her, and into what looked like a hatchway, nearly in the center; the rapid firing seemed to stop her progress....
Tomb then angled for a second attack:
We then made a turn to port and came back at her, striking her on the starboard quarter. At this time the Memphis was going through the water at good speed and the blow was a glancing one, passing under her counter, taking a portion of our stack away, but the torpedo failed again to explode.
Tomb then turned back upriver, with the Memphis firing on, but not hitting, the David.
When we reached Church Flats and made an examination of the torpedo we found the first blow was a good one, as the tube or cap on that side was mashed perfectly flat, and the glass tube containing the acid was broken, but being a defective tube it failed to explode. The second blow as not a good one, as the tube was slightly bent and the glass tube not broken. The expedition was a failure, caused by a defective tube. The torpedo held 95 pounds of rifle powder.
Captain Francis D. Lee, Chief of Engineers at Charleston and designer of the torpedo used, explained this failure:
As this occurrence may disturb the confidence heretofore felt in the torpedoes prepared by me, I deem it due to myself to state that about ten days since I saw Engineer Tomb, and in the presence of Mr. Theodore Stoney distinctly told him that the torpedo then on the "David" could not be relied upon, it having been exposed for the last six months to every vicissitude of weather and climate.
Lee suggested a new torpedo for the David, but Tomb departed without following up. Thus an opportunity to sink a second Federal steamer during the winter of 1864 eluded the Confederates. In response to the attack, Captain Stephen C. Rowan, then acting commander of the South Atlantic Blockading Squadron, cautioned Patterson to take measures preventing another attack. Those recommendations indicate, as did the precautions ordered by Rear-Admiral John Dahlgren earlier in January, the Federals were well acquainted to the threat:
You will, if practicable, obtain from the shore suitable spars for outriggers, and take your studding sail booms and other spare spars for that purpose. Having prepared your outriggers with 6 or 7 inch hawser, and nets to hang some 8 feet below the surface of the water, you will be protected from torpedo boats, but you must use great vigilance, row guard, and keep your people at or near their guns, giving them rest during the day.
Those simple practices offered countermeasures against the feared spar torpedo in 1864.

(Citations from ORN, Series I, Volume 15, pages 356-9.)

Monday, February 17, 2014

St. Andrews Bay Salt Works Raids Again

Historic marker in a public park in Panama City describing the salt works raids. Author's photo.

In a post in December (December 2013 post), we called attention to a major Union Navy raid on the Confederate salt works in St. Andrews Bay. Because of the critical importance of salt, the Confederates very quickly rebuilt the salt works in St. Andrews Bay after the Union forces departed. The southerners would not give up!  Escaped slaves told Acting Master W.R. Browne of the bark USS Restless about this, and that additional material was being transported down the Wetappo River to build larger works in the Bay. He sent in two parties of his men to again destroy these works. Browne reported on 17 February 1864:

Learning that the rebels had erected new Government salt works on West Bay, on the site of the old salt works destroyed by us in December, and that they had a force of 50 men armed and stationed there for protection, I fitted out the first cutter, manned with 13 men, under charge of Acting Ensign James J. Russell, with orders to proceed up the Gulf coast 20 miles, and march inland 7 miles to the salt works and attack them in the rear, while Acting Ensign Henry Eason with 10 men, in command of the second cutter, would proceed by the inside passage and attack them in the front at the same time.

The expedition was entirely successful, the works being abandoned upon the appearance of our men, Messrs. Russell’s and Eason’s party joining at the appropriate time, and immediately proceeded in the destruction of everything in the manufactories, consisting of 26 sheet-iron boilers, averaging 881 gallons, and 19 kettles, averaging 200 gallons, making an aggregate of 26,706 gallons, which cost in Montgomery $5.50 per gallon.”

The redoubtable Browne would send in additional raiding parties in March and April 1864. His determination and initiative earned him a promotion to Acting Lieutenant.