Vicksburg Campaign-The Fortress Surrenders

On July 7, 1863, Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles received the following telegram from the Office of the U.S. Military Telegraph at the War Department:

"From U.S. Miss Squadron, Flagship Blackhawk

Hon. Gideon Welles Secretary Navy

Sir, I have the honor to inform you that Vicksburg has surrendered to the U.S. Forces on this 4th of July.

Very Respectfully, Your Obedient Servt D.D. Porter Acting Rear Admiral."

In a more complete report to Welles, Porter noted that the Navy's mortar boats fired over 7,000 shells at Vicksburg; the ships fired about 4,500 shells from their direct fire weapons with an additional 4,500 fired from Navy guns on shore. On top of that, the Navy provided 6,000 shells to the Army. He also commented that "the capture of Vicksburg leaves us a large army and naval force free to act all along the river. The effect of this blow will be felt far up the tributaries of the Mississippi."


Upon hearing the news, President Lincoln is to have said "The Father of Waters again goes unvexed to the sea."

The Navy Memorial at Vicksburg National Military Park



Vicksburg Campaign-The Navy Shells Port Hudson From the River and Land

Farragut's squadron attempting to the run the guns at
Port Hudson and the destruction of USS Mississippi.

As we approach the 150th anniversary of the Battle of Gettysburg and the vast public interest in it, let us not forget the importance of Vicksburg.  Listen to the words of a Confederate Army engineer stationed in Vicksburg, Mississippi: "I am almost sorry to hear of Lee's progress Northward; for it looks as if the importance of Vicksburg were not understood.  What is Philadelphia to us if the Mississippi be lost?" 

Union  leaders in the West understood the importance of Vicksburg and spent considerable resources to take the town.  The "siege" of Vicksburg formally began on 18 May 1862 when Mayor L. Lindsay rejected the U.S. Navy's demand to surrender. Taking Vicksburg turned out to be more than just a simple assault.  It involved a complex process of controlling not only the Mississippi River, but its secondary rivers and nearby towns that guarded the river approaches. One of these towns near Vicksburg was Port Hudson, Louisiana.  The river town is strategically positioned on the Mississippi near the Red River.  Confederate forces used the Red River to bring supplies to Vicksburg from the west.  Thus, any encirclement of Vicksburg by Union ground forces was pointless unless Port Hudson was subdued.

The first major move on Port Hudson was to suppose to be a joint Army-Navy effort between Admiral David Farragut and Major General Nathaniel Banks.  However, Farragut grew tired of Banks' sluggish movements and delays. Since he took New Orleans with no ground forces, Farragut somewhat arrogantly believed he could push past Port Hudson and seize control of the Red River-Mississippi River junction with just his ships. 

Gunners from USS Richmond
prepare to fire the ship's forward
Parrott Rifle at Port Hudson

With USS Hartford in the lead, Farragut's seven ship squadron steamed up river in pairs with USS Mississippi bringing up the van of the squadron alone. The operation did not go well as all the seven ships ran aground as they attempted to hug the west bank of the river.  Hartford and Albatross got free and under the cover morning fog successfully passed the guns.  The other five were not so lucky as the wind blew away the fog.  Four of the ships received heavy damage, but successfully retreated back down stream. 

Mississippi, however, took several critical hits, caught on fire and sank.  The frigate's executive officer and future Admiral of the Fleet, Lieutenant George Dewey stayed on board long enough to spike the guns.  Thus ended the career of one of the Navy's most famous ships.  Farragut did not hear about Mississippi's demise until he read about it in local newspapers.  The movement was not one of the admiral's finest hours.

After that operation, the Navy was much more cautious and respectful of Port Hudson's defenses. Both Union and Confederate forces settled in for a long siege.  Banks' forces eventually encircled Port Hudson on the eastern side and U.S. Navy ships bombarded the town from positions down river.  

"Battery No. 10"-The Navy contributed four IX-inch
Dahlgrens to the Army's eighty-nine gun siege train
that encircled Port Hudson.  Sailors from USS
 Richmond manned the battery.

Steam sloops such as USS Monogahela (manned by both Dewey and  another Spanish-American War hero, Winfield Scott Schley) and Richmond, along with the ironclad USS Essex rotated in and out of the bomb line. The mortar schooner squadron that allegedly worked so well at New Orleans, returned from Hampton Roads and also began a steady bombardment of the town. 

After several failed assaults by Union ground forces on Port Hudson's extensive fortification network, Banks decided to blast the Confederates out of their position.  He brought in over eighty heavy guns to shell the Confederate defenses.

The Confederate defenders, however, had their own heavy guns.  Of particular note was a 10-inch Columbiad, which inflected heavy loses on Union ground forces.  Having nothing to respond to such firepower, the Army turned to the Navy for help.
The Navy had an answer. Originally intended for a new fort at Head of Passes (where the  Mississippi River empties into the Gulf of Mexico), the Navy had four IX-inch Dahlgrens in surplus.  The Navy agreed to transfer the weapons to the Port Hudson siege lines.  Labeled "Battery No. 10," gun teams from Richmond manned the weapons and took up positions about a mile east of the town. 

Preparing for Vicksburg: The Importance of Controlling the Yazoo River

In the latter days of 1862, Admiral David Porter, General William Sherman, and their respective subordinates produced a mountain of paperwork.  The paperwork included orders, requests for guidance and information, and plans related to the fortress town of Vicksburg, Mississippi.  

One factor to a successful conclusion to any Vicksburg campaign was having officers of both services agree on the importance of controlling the Yazoo River.  This meant that Yazoo had to be completely clear of enemy ground forces, ships, and torpedoes.  

Around this time, U.S. Army cartographers produced two maps of the area that show why Porter, Sherman, and Grant placed such high value on the river.  In order for Union ground forces to approach Vicksburg and be supplied from the north, the Yazoo River had to be under the U.S. Navy's complete control.  (Note: Modern day maps of  Vicksburg are extremely misleading, as the course of the Yazoo has been shifted to the south since the war ended.)  

December 1862 Map-The Yazoo River (on the left) and its relation to Vicksburg (lower right)

January 5 1863 Map of Vicksburg and the surrounding country side and rivers.  The Yazoo River at the time
emptied in to Mississippi west of Vicksburg and flowed from north to southwest.  

U.S. Naval Cowboys on the Mississippi-October 1862

In 19th century American history, the long range cattle drive is one of the great icons of the era.  One such drive of 1,500 head of cattle started in Texas in early August 1862.  The Confederate Army purchased the herd and directed the drovers to take the cattle to Camp Moore, the headquarters for local Confederate ground troops in Louisiana.  The drovers succeeded in overcoming the biggest geographic obstacle when they moved the herd across the Mississippi River at Plaquemine, Louisiana.  Here the drovers could finally rest while they waited at the local depot for the New River Railroad to take the herd the rest of the way.

USS Katahdin, one of the four gunboats that seized 1,500 head of cattle

It was then quite unfortunate for the drovers that a U.S. Navy squadron consisting of USS Kineo, Sciota, Katahdin, and Itasca (all "90-day" gunboat-type warships) happened to spot the herd during a patrol.  The squadron's commander, Lieutenant-Commander George Ransom, found Confederate Army purchase orders among the drovers' papers and declared the herd contraband property. 

Ransom, however, was unsure what to do with the cattle, as this was not the usual type of property Naval officers would condemn and send to a prize court for adjudication. He thought about destroying the herd, but then decided that 1,500 head of cattle was extremely valuable and worth saving.  He had to act quickly, as Confederate partisans were extremely active.

Lieutenant Commander
George Ransom, USN

Ransom decided to keep the herd and sent one ship to New Orleans to retrieve five Army transports.  Upon retrieving the ships, Ransom hired several African American men on the spot to help load the herd.  The loading started at 2:30 in the morning on October 3rd.  By noon the next day, 1,300 cattle had been loaded. The rest were considered too wild and the commander instructed his African American labor force to drive the rest south to Donaldsville on the eastern shore of the river.  He assigned Katahdin and Itasaca to stay with this part of the herd at all times.

 The rest of Ransom's gunboats and transports convoyed south towards New Orleans.  As the flotilla approached Donaldsville, Confederate partisans attacked with four batteries of horse artillery.  The squadron returned fire with their XI-inch Dahlgrens and 20-pounder Parrot Rifles.  After a few hours of fighting, the partisans called off their attack.  While the convoy rolled on, the partisans' artillery did cause a significant number of causalities, including the executive officer of Sciota who had a cannon ball bounce off his hip and then exploded on his right hand.  He died two hours later.  His last words to his captain were "Tell my mother I tried to be a good man."

By October 10, the convoy and the 1,300 head of cattle got through to New Orleans. A few days later, Katadhin and Itasca successfully escorted the other 200 to safety. 

CSS Arkansas is Lost: August 1862

The castemate ironclad CSS Arkansas was a one ship wrecking crew on the Mississippi River.  The ironclad interfered with Union plans to take Vicksburg and complete their control of the Mississippi River.  Thus, the U.S. Navy made several attempts to eliminate the ironclad.  While the attempts succeeded in damaging Arkansas, the ironclad remained  a "fleet-in-being."  Even if she was only one ship, she was still a threat to any Union offensive in the West.


Isaac Brown, commanding officer
of CSS Arkansas

Arkansas' gallant commanding officer, Issac Brown, decided the ship needed a break to regroup.  Brown barely slept or ate during the month of July.  Worse, he fell ill to the "swamp fever" epidemic that swept both Union and Confederate camps and ships during the months of July and August.  Because of this, he was granted four days of shore leave.  Before he left, Brown gave strict orders to his executive officer Lieutenant Henry K. Stevens to repair and refit Arkansas and not to let anyone move the ship until he returned from liberty. 

Unfortunately for Stevens, senior Confederate leadership had other plans. Confederate General Earl Van Dorn, whose skill set as a general were highly suspect, demanded Stevens immediately prepare Arkansas for battle.  Van Dorn planned to use the ironclad in a counter-attack against Union lines at Baton Rouge.  Stevens refused and recited Brown's orders to not move the ship.  The decision was referred to Flag Officer William Lynch, a man whose two greatest claims to fame were getting his squadron destroyed at Roanoke Island in early 1862 and claiming to have scientific proof of the existence of the lost Biblical cites of Sodom and Gomorrah (read more about that here).  Lynch agreed with Van Dorn.  Now being faced down by two flag officers, Stevens' will broke and agreed to make Arkansas ready. 

Stevens wrote to Brown about the situation.  Despite running a high fever and barely being able to walk, Brown jumped out of bed and took two trains to get to Vicksburg.   He was too late.  Arkansas already left four hours after he got there.

As Arkansas approached Baton Rouge, the ship's engines began to fail. Upon seeing Arkansas head south, Essex followed in hot pursuit and opened fire.  Arkansas' engines eventually gave out.  Unable to maneuver and bring any guns to bear on Essex, Stevens ordered the ship beached so that she could be scuttled. 

With Essex bearing down her, Stevens set  Arkansas on fire.  Brown was able to get transportation south just in time to see his ship explode.  Brown later stated that he did not blame his executive officer for what happened.  He squarely placed blame on Lynch and Van Dorn for not being very smart with their side's limited resources. (Read Brown's entire account in Battle and Leaders here)  The explosion destroyed the Confederacy's last major warship on the Mississippi River.

Farragut's Punitive Raid on Donaldsonville

If siege craft could be classified as an occurrence where ancient rules of war still applied and honor still existed, guerrilla/partisan activity would be its polar opposite.  The activity tended to bring out the worst in partisans trying to do anything they could to harass an enemy that possessed superior firepower and numbers.  Likewise, the uniformed sailor/soliders' attempts to suppress the partisan activity bore little fruit.  This led to more extreme measures.

One of many such exchanges came to a head in early August 1862 in Donaldsonville, Louisiana.  Located on the Mississippi River between New Orleans and Baton Rouge, Donaldsonville once served as Louisiana's state capital in the 1830s.   Farragut's ships and U.S. Army transports frequently passed by the town, moving back and forth from the front lines near Baton Rouge. 

As the Union ships passed by Donaldsonville, a group of "partisan rangers," led by local businessman Captain Phillippe Landry, frequently took pot shots at them. On the evening of August 6, 1862, Landry's men escalated their attacks by firing several volleys of musket and small cannon fire at the Union army transport Sallie Robinson.   A few minutes later, a second group of partisans fired at another ship that they thought was an unarmed transport.  It turned out to be the powerful steam sloop USS Brooklyn.  The warship responded with one shot from her aft pivot IX-inch Dahlgren, but the partisans had already withdrawn. 

Upon being told of these attacks, Farragut issued a short and stern warning to the citizens of Donaldsonville "Every time my boats are fired upon, I will burn a portion of your town." 


USS Hartford

The citizens either didn't receive the message or willfully ignored Farragut.  The partisans attacked the transport St. Charles the following night.  True to his word, Farragut advised Donaldsonville to evacuate all women and children on August 10. USS Hartford and Brooklyn then opened fired.  The ships' gunners specifically targeted Landry's hotel, his private residence, and any other home or business of a known partisan.  Several buildings were destroyed and burned to the ground. Farragut also accepted a dozen slaves seeking freedom and seized several heads of cattle and sheep. 


As uncivilized as it seems, the punitive action worked.  Realizing that they had no effective means of fighting back against such firepower and that future partisan attack would only bring more destruction and loss of property, plantation owners from the parishes of Accession and St. James passed a resolution demanding Governor Thomas Moore do all he could to stop partisans from attacking U.S. Navy ships.  The river raids stopped and so did the Navy's retaliations.  The plantations even swore a loyalty oath to the U.S. Government (so they could keep their slaves).  However, they secretly supported the partisans' ground operations for the rest of the war. 

The Naval Siege of Vicksburg Begins

When attempting to capture a city, fortress, or other strongpoint, the formal rules of siege craft require the opposing force to ask the authorities if they would kindly surrender. The commanding officer of the garrison or civilian authorities would either accept a surrender and negotiate the terms or reject it. Upon a rejection, the siege would formally begin. While many sieges did not follow such strict rules of protocol, the epic siege of Vicksburg, Mississippi could said to have begun on May 18, 1862.

In May, U.S. Naval Commander Samuel Phillips Lee, cousin of Confederate General Robert E. Lee, proceed up the Mississippi River on the sloop-of-war USS Oneida. Upon arriving under a flag of truce, Lee formally delivered a request to Lazarus Lindsey, the mayor of Vicksburg, to surrender his city. Lee wrote

Mayor of the City of Vicksburg:

SIR: It becomes my duty to give you notice to remove the women and children beyond the range of our guns within twenty-four hours, as it will be impossible to attack the defenses without injuring or destroying the town, a proceeding which all the authorities of Vicksburg seem determined to require. I had hoped that the same spirit which induced the military authorities to retire from the city of New Orleans rather than wantonly sacrifice the lives and property of its inhabitants would have been followed here.

Respectfully, yours,

S. PHILLIPS LEE

Lindsey responded to Lee twenty-four hours later:

S. P. LEE, U. S. N.,

Commanding Advance of Naval Division:

...I will state that neither the municipal authorities nor the citizens will ever consent to the surrender of the city.

Respectfully, yours,

L. LINDSAY,

Confederate Lieutenant Colonel James Autrey, military governor of Vicksburg, was a bit more blunt in his rejection letter to Lee:

I have to state that Mississippians don't know and refuse to learn how to surrender to an enemy. If Commodore Farragut or Brigadier-General Butler can teach them, let them come and try.

Thus, Vicksburg would be no New Orleans. Upon getting the rejection, Farragut brought up more ships and shelled the city on May 27.

Iron Men Afloat: Rams at the Battle of Memphis

6 June marks the 150th anniversary of the Battle of Memphis.  The short yet decisive battle was one of the only fleet vs. fleet actions during the American Civil War.  NHHC defines a "Ram" as a "ship whose principal weapon is its own bow, hardened and reinforced to penetrate the hull of an enemy ship, and usually strengthened internally to avoid or reduce self-inflicted damage from the collision."  

This post, focusing on the technology of naval warfare, is part of the "Iron Men Afloat" series with the Civil War Monitor blog.  Make sure you check out fellow CWN 150 guest blogger Craig Swain's post on Marker Hunter. 
______________________

The fleet that steadily approached the Memphis levee was a powerful one.  Much in the same taste of the Confederate River Defense Fleet, the Union navy christened their five ironclad warships operating along the upper Mississippi in homage to the great river cities of the North.  Flag Officer Davis, commanding the flagship Benton, trekked alongside the USS Carondelet, St. Louis, Cairo, and Louisville on their way to Memphis with an air of confidence bordering egotism.  The newly installed leader intended on commanding the Western Flotilla “like an orchestra without an instrument out of tune,” devoid of outside distraction or influence.  These gunboats, built by acclaimed St. Louis engineer and Mississippi River salvager James B. Eads, were strong and powerful but lacked some early inefficiency in design and speed.  If the Federal War Departments “listened attentively” to Eads’ design, the Mississippi River Ram Fleet functioning alongside Davis was the exact opposite.

The newly formulated Ram Fleet commanded by Charles Ellet, Jr. matched well with the eight Confederate rams.  The Ram Fleet that Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton commissioned Ellet to develop in April encompassed his vocational skills by converting Ohio River steamers into faster and stronger counterparts to the River Defense Fleet.  Given the character of Ellet’s design, one might assume Federal Secretary of Navy Gideon Welles would accept the new plans at face value.  Quite the contrary, Welles never completely accepted Ellet’s concept of a ramming fleet, and summarily dismissed the idea in favor of John Ericsson’s Monitor design.  Moreover, Welles wrote in his personal diary that Ellet himself could not be trusted because he was “not a naval man,” leaving Secretary of War Stanton as the only person who acknowledged the idea in early 1862.  It was not until the CSS Virginia’s deadly discourse with the USS Cumberland that many officials in Washington started to take Ellet serious.  Stanton invited Ellet to Washington on 14 March for a preliminary discussion of details and supplies.  Inevitably, Stanton would use the guise of the War Department to construct, outfit, and run Ellet’s project.

Seeing the success of the Confederate ironclad Virginia’s first day performance at Hampton Roads in early March, officials in Washington grew convinced that Ellet’s design might provide the answer to the Confederate naval forces in the west.  Reports from Major General Henry W. Halleck in the West speculated that the Confederates had “one or more river boats [. . .] like the Merrimack” in New Orleans increasingly hastened the necessity of immediate action.  Ellet did not personally care for Ericsson’s Monitor design in the wake of its clash with the Virginia, and instead stood convinced his enterprise superior.  His 1855 pamphlet on the use of steam-driven rams, which fell on deaf ears during the Crimean War and the Civil War’s outset, finally came to fruition when its implantation proved more important than ever.

These rams, ranging from 170 to 180 feet in length, used 12 to 16 inches of iron-braced timber to reinforce the ramming bow.  Ellet’s one directional design intended to use the entire weight of each vessel to crush opposing forces upon impact, akin to the Greek triremes of antiquity.  Ellet was extremely confident that the aid of the Mississippi River current would “run these rams into them, and if possible, sink them.”  Indeed, Ellet’s background as an author of several studies of flood control on the Mississippi and Ohio Rivers further solidified his pronounced expertise.  With four rams ready for service by the beginning of May, the Union navy now possessed both firepower and ramming speed.

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For sources and more information, please email the author at matthew.t.eng@navy.mil.

Facing the Forts: The West Gulf Blockading Squadron

Today (25 April) marks the 150th anniversary of the fall of New Orleans. In commemoration of Union control of the Crescent City, we have begun a series of posts in coordination with the Civil War Monitor Magazine, titled “Iron Men Afloat.” For each topic covered, the CWN 150 blog will focus on the machines and technology used, while the Civil War Monitor will discuss the men (i.e. living component) involved. This is the first in an ambitious series of cross posts. For the companion post at the Civil War Monitor blog, please go HERE. 

USS Hartford at New Orleans (Library of Congress)

United States Navy 
The ships of the West Gulf Blockading faced a daunting task in April 1862.  The Navy set its eyes on New Orleans, the South’s largest city and major port. Records show that Captain David Glasgow Farragut began planning to capture New Orleans began as far back as January and February.  The future Admiral knew that taking New Orleans meant taking or running past the powerful Forts Jackson and St. Philip, situated across each other along the Mississippi River. Farragut took command of the newly created West Gulf Blockading Squadron in late 1861, arriving with his fleet in February.  This would be his first major test as squadron commander during the Civil War. The results would give him international acclaim.

The majority of focus on ship strength during the battle centers on Farragut’s flagship, USS Hartford. Built just prior to the war, the Hartford boasted steam and sail capabilities with a top speed of 13.5 knots.  This was one advantage that proved to be beneficial for sloops when compared to sluggish ironclads. The ship was by all accounts no different than any other wooden sloop-of-war created in the antebellum Navy.  Her war service record, however, made her one of the Navy’s most recognizable ships. By 1865, the ship seemed mythical. At one point in the battle (24 April), Farragut’s leadership helped save the grounded ship from a burning barge that nearly engulfed the entire ship in flames. The above print from the Library of Congress’ collection brilliantly explains the harrowing sight of battle on 24 April.  The Hartford was just one of many Union ships involved in the battle against Forts Jackson and St. Philip. The attack utilized several different ship types of the West Gulf Blockading Squadron, including sloops, schooners, mortar boats, and hastily built gunboats.

The Union plan of attack was not without its flaws.  The major obstacle standing in the way of Farragut’s fleet, besides fortifications and river barrier chain, was David Dixon Porter’s mortar ships.  Slow and relatively untested, each of the 21 mortar schooners had a single 13-inch seacoast mortar capable of hurling a 227-pound shell nearly 5,000 yards. The arched trajectory a lot the plunging fire to fall on top of the enemy target: ideal for shore-based fortifications. Although Farragut did not  ascribe to the effectiveness of the giant cannons, he would use his fleet during the upcoming engagement regardless. 

(Library of Congress)

LEFT:  Union plan of attack, sketched by William Waud. Notice the sketches of CSS Louisiana and CSS Manasseh's in the left corner of the image.






 The ongoing debate of ship vulnerability and susceptibility to shore-based fortification would be tested at New Orleans. Before April 1862, few naval engagements involved ships against heavy fortifications. Although several “gauntlets” were passed in the early months of 1862 (See “Commander Walke Runs the Gauntlet”). The Mississippi River, either at its inner corridors or its entrance, was the major objective in the West.  It was there that Farragut felt David Dixon Porter’s rag-tag mortar fleet could be utilized. If anything, the results proved to be psychologically damaging, as some of the shells with their unreliable fuses did hit the fortifications.  According to historian Chester Hearn, Porter predicted he could subdue the forts within two days of bombardment.  He did not.  During the first phase of the battle (18-23 April), Porter fired nearly 3,000 mortars over the course of five days. Civil War Monitor and CWN 150 blogger Craig Swain recently wrote about the unwieldy and inaccurate mortars for the blog.

Unadilla-Class Gunboat, 1861

Unadilla-class gunboats, commonly referred to as the “90 Day Gunboats,” were employed in every naval theater of warfare during the Civil War, from the battle at Port Royal to the triumphant Vicksburg campaign. Each ship was lightly armed with one XI-inch Dahlgren smoothbore, two 24-pounder Parrot rifles, and one 20-pounder Parrot.  The U.S. Navy used the wrought iron Parrot rifle extensively during the war, even if the design was flawed (Many of the guns burst throughout the war).  It is hard to compare the "wholesale" design of the Parrot with the tested one of Dahlgren’s, who Spencer Tucker called “the most influential figure in the development of nineteenth century ordnance.” Of the 17 ships comprising the West Gulf Blockading Squadron, nine were Unadilla-class gunboats: Cayuga, Itasca, Katahdin, Kennebec, Kineo, Pinola, Sciota, Winona, and Wissahickon.

In total, the squadron assembled below New Orleans totaled 188 guns to the 105 guns at Forts Jackson and St. Philip (75 at Fort Jackson and 30 at Fort St. Philip).  General Mansfield Lovell and other Confederate planners hoped the fortifications and ships would be enough to stave off Farragut’s wooden fleet.

Confederate Navy 
Facing the 188 guns of the West Gulf Blockading Squadron were several ironclads and cottonclad rams that comprised the Civilian-run Confederate River Defense Fleet. Three ironclads were at New Orleans at the time of the 24 April engagement: CSS Manassas, CSS Louisiana, and CSS Mississippi. Only Manassas and Louisiana were involved in the conflict, as Mississippi was incomplete at the time of battle.

CSS Louisiana

Louisiana loosely resembled many of the casemate-type ironclads used in the eastern theater like CSS Virginia and CSS Richmond. The ship was hastily built amidst pressure from the blockade and from skilled laborers. After she sank following the fleet’s passing below New Orleans, the Louisiana’s Executive Officer pointed out in the Official Records that, above all else, the ship was poorly designed for armament, making it only a formidable ship at close range. The armor of the ship did prove effective in battle. Louisiana briefly engaged with the Brooklyn during the engagement, having the Union vessels’ cannon balls bounced off the armor plating. The only major casualty of the Louisiana during its brief engagement at New Orleans was its commanding officer, Charles F. McIntosh.

CSS Manassas

CSS Manassas made notoriety earlier in the year when it thwarted the Federal blockade at the Head of Passes. Her design sparked much curiosity; so much that David Dixon Porter attempted to save the ship from sinking to examine it at the end of the battle. New Orleans merchant John Stevenson took the captured tow boat upriver to Algiers where it was converted into a revolutionary “turtle-backed” ironclad design, complete with 1.5-inch armor and chain complementing the iron ram and single Dahlgren gun.  The new ship was christened CSS Manassas.  During the battle, Manassas managed to ram the Mississippi and Brooklyn. The damage, however, was minimal. The vessel was eventually abandoned on the shore and burned.

Stacking Up
It is important to note the simplicity of the West Gulf Blockading Squadron in comparison to other squadrons or Confederate fleets. According to the National Park Service, the United States Navy suffered 229 casualties to the Confederacy’s 782. The Union Navy lost one vessel, the gunboat Varuna. The United States Navy ran the forts with no ironclad ships. The Confederate Navy lost twelve vessels during the run of the West Gulf Blockading Squadron past Forts Jackson and St. Philip. Of the three Confederate ironclads at the battle of New Orleans, none survived the end of April:

• The CSS Manassas ran aground and sunk on 24 April by steam frigate USS Mississippi.
• The crew of the CSS Louisiana set her afire to avoid capture on 28 April. 
• The incomplete CSS Mississippi was burned by Confederates to avoid capture by Farragut on 25 April. 

Perhaps it is best to take a quote from the Ironclad Board, men who were ironically assigned to employ new naval technology against wooden ships. Once you read the quote, it is as if they read straight from an after-action report at New Orleans:

“Wooden ships may be said to be but coffins for their crews when brought in conflict with iron-clad vessels; but the speed of the former, we take for granted, being greater than that of the latter, they can readily choose their position and keep out of harm’s way.”

Steam power had much more to do with the battle of New Orleans than iron-wielded machinery. With a hearty understanding of strategy and tactics, Farragut’s fleet soundly passed the Forts at New Orleans, leaving a clear path to New Orleans with no sign of reinforcements between them and the strategic and commercial center. On 25 April 1862, Farragut’s forces accepted its surrender. Although the squadron’s sailors were not made of iron, their courage was wielded and forged at the gates of New Orleans in April 1862. Read more about the Battle of New Orleans, including a complete sequence of events of the engagement, HERE.


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Where Are They Now? 
 Bruised and battered from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, both forts remain standing, albeit more in a figurative sense. St. Philip, the smaller of the two fortifications watching over the entrance to New Orleans, is only available via boat or helicopter. Both forts are part of the U.S. National Register of the Historic Places, as well as U.S. National Historic Landmarks. The many Unadilla-class gunboats created to swell the naval register immediately following the outbreak of the war were primarily sold off to foreign countries when the war ended. As for Farragut’s flagship, the USS Hartford remained in the fleet serving with distinction for the remainder of the Civil War. Falling into disrepair, the ship sank at her Portsmouth birth in 1956.  Here is a picture of the stern emblem of the ship, which is now part of the Hampton Roads Naval Museum’s accessioned collection.

Navy Nurses in the Civil War

USS Red Rover on the Mississippi River

The Civil War was a time of many "firsts" for the Navy.  Now that it is the first day of Women's history month, it would seem poignant to talk about the historic first contributions of females in the Navy.  Like African Americans, these minority members of sea service exemplified the three tenets of the U.S. Navy: Honor, Courage, and Commitment. 

Although nurses were not recruited in high numbers during this time period (especially for the Navy), effective clinicians would eventually become integral to the health and stability of any military.  It is no surprise then that disease, not combat, was the greatest killer of the American Civil War. 

Mother Mary Ann Bickerdyke

According to Susan H. Godson, the influx of nurses in the United States (Union) military grew early on as a result of  "the growing carnage on the battlefields."  Efforts were increased from newly created organizations like the Women's Central Association of Relief and the U.S. Sanitary Commission.  When fighting began on Virginia's peninsula in the spring of 1862, steamboats were converted into floating hospitals to transport the evacuated wounded.  The U.S. Sanitary commission paid for the staffing of these ships with surgeons, dressers, and now male and female nurses.  Female nurses "prepared food, stocked shelves, and made the inform as comfortable as possible."   One of the more famous eastern transporters, the City of Memphis, was led by Mother Mary Ann Bickerdyke, perhaps the most famous nurse of the war. 

USS Red Rover

In the West, ships did not have the luxury of swift transport to a shore hospital, so floating hospitals like the Red Rover were commissioned.  Commissioned on 26 December 1862, the Red Rover served with the Mississippi River Squadron for the remainder of the war.  The medical personnel included four nuns of the Sisters of the Holy Cross as well as five black women - Alice Kennedy, Sarah Kinno, Ellen Campbell, Betsy Young, and Dennis Downs, who assisted the nuns.  These women were the very first women to serve on a U.S. Navy ship, and the predecessors to the Navy Nurse Corps of the 19th century. 

Source: 
Godson, Susan H.  Serving Proudly: A History of Women in the U.S. Navy.  Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 2001. 

The Confederacy's First Ironclad and Her Attack on a Wooden Ship

As head of the U.S. diplomatic mission to the free city of Hamburg, James Anderson was quite far away from Civil War. During his daily business in September 1861, the war came to him.  One day, he encountered a German citizen who had just left New Orleans. This citizen, who had Union sympathies, provided Anderson with a sketch and description of a "turtle"-like ironclad (shown above) with a "hellish engine" under construction. The ironclad's builders, according to the information, wanted to ram the steam sloop USS Brooklyn.  Anderson quickly passed the intelligence to Secretary of State William Seward.

The man behind this turtle from Hell, was New Orleans river pilot John A. Stepheson. Having failed to get any support from the Confederate government for his idea, Stepheson raised money on his own and converted an ice breaking tugboat into an ironclad ram. He wanted to construct "such a vessel that would be able to drive off or sink the most powerful man-of-war without the use of cannon or other instrument of warfare."

Once constructed, the Confederate government came to its senses and bought Stepheson's warship. It named her CSS Manassas.  In October 1861, Confederate Naval officers took Manassas and several other small ships down the Mississippi River and attack the Union squadron  of three ships at the Head of Passes.  What is the first ironclad attack against a wooden warship, Manassas went after the steam sloop USS Richmond under the command of Commander John Pope (not to be confused with the Union Army general John Pope).  Neither side distinguished themselves in the battle as Manassas' ram attack only achieved a glancing blow, some of the rockets fired by the Confederate squadron meant to set off a series of fire rafts landed on their own ships, the Union squadron' cannon fire was erradtic, and both sides ships ran aground attempting to engage.

The Confederate squadron withdrew back to New Orelans, but not after putting enough fear into Pope to order a retreat.  "Put this matter in any light you may, it is the most ridiculous affair that ever took place in the American Navy," Gideon Welles wrote to David Dixon Porter after the war. Pope later asked for medical leave.  Welles made the request permanent and forced Pope out of the service. Manassas, in the mean time, was made ready to defend New Orelans.

Carondelet: Then and Now

As explained in earlier posts, James Eads was awarded many of the major naval building contracts in the western theater. He divvied up the work between several shipyards, but the Union Iron Works at Carondelet, Missouri hosted the lion's share of production.

Eads turned an already busy port town into a major naval center virtually overnight. His contract to construct the City-class gunboats (more about them soon) resulted in the building of four new ironclad warships in Carondelet: the Baron de Kalb, Louisville, Pittsburg, and most appropriately, the Carondelet.
The boatyards spanned across much of Carondelet's Mississippi riverfront property, ranging from the confluence of the River des Peres and Missisippi northeast past Marceau and Davis streets and along Vulcan Street. The warehouses and docks were supported by nearby rolling mills, sawmills, and foundries. Businesses like the R.C. Totten and Company Foundry in St. Louis provided much of the armor for the new vessels.


The City-class ships were finally completed in January 1862, and Carondelet's namesake ironclad would feature prominently in many of the upcoming battles for the west. Carondelet would continue to build more vessels, including many of the tinclads that were introduced later in the war.

(Image from Google Maps)

Today there's no evidence Eads's shipyards ever existed, though many other buildings from the Civil War-era remain elsewhere in town. The shoreline where ironclads were once built is now overgrown, and empty, decaying factories stand nearby. The area that was once the center of the marine ways is now the home of the New World Pasta factory. I visited Carondelet in July, and took these photos just before a storm blew in.

Ship Island-The Unsinkable Tender

To borrow a modern U.S. Navy term, each of the U.S.N's blockading squadrons needed a "forward deployed" base near the war zone if it had any hopes of keeping ships on their stations for lengthy periods of time. The Gulf Blockading Squadrons' base was Ship Island.

Located about 15 miles south of the mainland of Mississippi, Ship Island had been used for decades before the Civil War as a safe anchorage. The island's value to national security was evident with the construction of Fort Massachusetts in the 1850s (not finished until the end of the war).

The 4th Louisiana occupied the island at the beginning of the war, but it soon became evident that it would difficult for Confederate forces to hold while U.S. Navy ships were the area. Confederate Major-General G.E. Twiggs noted in September 1861 that a squadron of "Two heavy frigates, two steamers, a brig, and two tenders" were bearing down on his garrison. Fearful of being cut off and not waiting for further instructions, he wisely ordered an evacuation.

Union ground forces formally occupied the island a few weeks later. For the rest of the war, Ship Island served as a major repair and resupply base for blockading ships and as a jumping off point for operations all along the Gulf Coast.

Confederate Ironclads on the Mississippi

Just as their Northern counterparts, Confederate naval authorities looked first to the sea. Fortifying essential ports, and converting merchantmen were the primary problems for Confederate Secretary of the Navy Stephen R. Mallory. But by June 1861, Tennessee had passed a resolution calling on Richmond to fund a large-scale building program in the west, and Kentuckians could look across the Ohio River and see the Union’s Timberclads steaming unmolested, with more warships being constructed. The states of the upper south already knew what the U.S. Army and Navy had in store for the Mississippi.

In August 1861, Memphis shipbuilder John T. Shirley offered Secretary Mallory an opportunity to construct the Confederacy’s first ironclads on western waters. Already aware of demand for a naval presence, Mallory consulted with officers and naval architects in order to understand his options and resolved to fully back an ironclad building program. On 23 August, Confederate Tennessee Congressman David M. Currin submitted legislation to allocate funds for the creation of an inland navy, including $160,000 for the construction of two ironclads. The bill appropriated more funds for the naval defense of New Orleans, and Mallory would use these additional allocations to finance the construction of the additional ironclads Mississippi and Louisiana. On 24 August, the bill was passed and Jefferson Davis signed the act into law. The Confederate naval buildup in the west would now unfold.

CSS Sumter Makes a Break For It

CSS Sumter in New Orleans

It was realized early on by Confederate Secretary of the Navy Stephen Mallory that he would have to have actual commissioned warships on the high seas if the Confederate guerre d'course was going to suceed.  Among the first of these Confederate cruisers was CSS Sumter under the command of Raphel Semmes.  Here is Semmes' account of the cruiser's dramatic breakout out from the Head of Passes and into the Gulf of Mexico on June 30, 1861.

Finally, on Sunday morning, the 30th of June, it having been reported to me that the Brooklyn was absent from her station, I caused steam to be gotten up, got underway, and ran down toward the Pass. As we approached the mouth of the river we discovered the Brooklyn with our glasses, standing back under steam and sail to regain her station, and it was for some time a little doubtful whether we could pass the bar before she came up.

To add to my perplexity, the pilot protested that he knew only the bar of the Southwest Pass, and could not undertake to run me out of Pass a l’Outre [the eastern branch of the Mississippi River delta]. I continued on, however, hoisting a signal for a pilot at the fore.

As luck would have it, a pilot happened to be present at the pilots’ station a little above the light house, and as we ran by it the gallant fellow pushed aboard in his boat, and in fifteen minutes afterwards he had us outside the bar. We discharged him in great haste and all sail and steam, the Brooklyn being in pursuit about 4 miles distant. The next few hours were of course very anxious ones for me, as the Brooklyn had the reputation of great speed, and our relative powers were to be tested.

By 3:30, Commander Poor gave up the chase. As he bore up, I sent my men into the rigging, and we gave three hearty cheers for the flag of the Confederate States, thus for the first time thrown to the breeze on the high seas by a ship of war.