The Best Place to Experience The Battle of Mobile Bay is at the NMUSN

Fife Rail and Wheel of USS Hartford

On this day 150 years ago, Admiral David Glasgow Farragut made history. After a dazzling victory at New Orleans early in the war, Admiral Farragut spent the next several years fighting through the Mississippi River. By the middle of 1864, it became necessary to capture Mobile Bay, the South's last major port city on the Gulf Coast. Capturing it would help tighten the anaconda-like grip on the southern coastline.

Hartford Cathead

The bright August morning proved to be one of the most surprising achievements in Farragut's long and distinguished career. Now a century and a half later, many of the relics left to commemorate the ships and men of the battle are long gone. The Hartford, one of the most iconic ships of the Civil War, is broken up and scattered to different museums and institutions around the United States. How then do you decide where to see the best collection of artifacts from the battle during the Civil War sesquicentennial?

For those of us who could not make the trek down south for the sesquicentennial anniversary, many visitors commented it was an event worthy of its name and place in history. Fortunately, Civil War enthusiasts still have an opportunity to see several some of the relics of the battle. There is no better place to share this connection between past and present than the National Museum of the United States Navy (NMUSN) at the Washington Navy Yard.

NMUSN Curator Jennifer Marland took me around to several of the artifacts of Admiral Farragut and the Battle of Mobile Bay. She showed me her favorite piece of the collection, a small series of sketches depicting the battle. "So many paintings and sketches surfaced after the battle, some coming weeks and even years later," said Marland. "I really like this sketch from crew members present at the battle. You get a better sense of what these sailors really experienced." The sketch, albeit crude and hastily put together, tells the story of a sailor's front row seat to one of the United States Navy's greatest battles.

Other interesting items in the National Museum of the United States Navy collection includes Admiral Farragut's presentation cane, a large model of Hartford, a cathead, ship bell, and surrender letter from Ft. Gaines.

Naval Mine at NMUSN

Why are these torpedoes important today? 
Although Admiral Farragut may or may not have said the immortal words "Damn the Torpedoes, Full Speed Ahead," the crafty countermeasure still proved an effective defense on the 5th, sinking the Tecumseh in the process. The artifacts on display at NMUSN are a constant reminder that every great piece of naval history comes with a price.

The National Museum of the United States Navy is open Monday to Friday from 9:00am to 5:00pm.

Special Thanks to Jennifer Marland for giving me an in depth tour of the NMUSN gallery.

Navy 'Changed Trajectory of the War'

 

1862 illustration shows captured British blockade runners. (U.S. Navy)

 

The Navy "changed the trajectory of the war" was the way one of the nation's leading historians described the service's contribution to the ultimate Union victory in 1865.

Speaking April 16 at the United States Naval Institute's annual meeting in Washington, Dr. Craig Symonds, co-winner of the 2009 Lincoln Prize for his Lincoln and His Admirals, said the blockade of Confederate ports from the Carolinas on the Atlantic to the Texas Gulf Coast "was the largest enterprise the Navy undertook," ultimately involving more than 500 ships, more than 400 of them converted merchantmen -- "the last time that was still possible," and 100,000 men.

The Union Navy transformed itself from a fleet of 42 ships scattered around the globe or in ordinary at shipyards with a few thousand officers and experienced tars in 1861 to a technologically adept force with rifled guns, iron-plated, screw propellers, etc. operating with a "changed lower deck" of "volunteers. contrabands from the South, free blacks from the North" in 1865.

When President Abraham Lincoln announced the blockade, Symonds, a professor emeritus of history at the Naval Academy, contends that he and Secretary of State William Seward understood that it "was an act of war" and implied "a kind of recognition" of the Confederacy.

But it proved hugely advantageous for the Union.  Great Britain. while acknowledging the Confederacy as a belligerent, declared itself neutral in the North American war and by doing that effectively closed off its ports, particularly important in the Caribbean, to Confederate privateers or later its commerce raiders trying to sell off their captured "prizes."

But the reality of blockade is actually far more difficult than simply declaring it.  "You actually have to do it" over 3,500 miles of coast with 189 harbors and navigable inlets. "Maintaining it was hard work.  Blockade service [meant] days that were long and tedious ... in all weather.  Usually at night and often in rain or drizzle, the blockade runners were creeping in and out of Southern ports.

It did work on a number of levels, Symonds said, including persuading a large number of foreign ship-owners never to risk their vessels in a race for safety and riches in a Confederate harbor. The blockade caused "the slow asphyxiation" of the rebellion and "very likely made the war shorter."

With the profit motive of privateering proving to be a myth, the Confederacy turned to buying ships overseas for commerce raiding.  Led by James D. Bulloch, a onetime officer in the United States Navy and experienced merchant marine officer, the Jefferson Davis government put to sea a "dozen or so" of these ships, most notably Alabama that destroyed 284 American merchantmen over the course of the war. 

Indeed, the Confederate Navy's Civil War didn't end until November 1865 when Shenandoah returned to Liverpool, having destroyed a number of American whalers operating in the Pacific -- after Robert E. Lee's surrender at Appomattox.

The commerce raiders were an interesting story all their own.  They were officered by Confederates, but the overwhelming majority of the crew were British, Scot, Irish and French "who didn't think much" of promises of future fortunes for all when the Union threw in the towel.  "They were in it for the money" immediately. When the prize money remained empty promises and the risks great, many deserted.

Commerce raiding "was a great idea for the Confederacy" because it caused maritime insurance rates to skyrocket and caused American-flagged vessels to change registry  to avoid destruction.

But in the end, the commerce raiders "did not bring Lincoln to the negotiating table" nor did they weaken the blockade.

For the greater part of the war, the Army and Navy operated separately even when fighting in the same area. Think New Orleans; think Charleston.  Yet from the war's start on the  rivers lying west of the Appalachians to the Mississippi, combined operations proved very successful at Forts Henry and Donelson and Island Number 10 -- keeping Kentucky in the Union and splintering Tennessee. Joint operations also set the stage for Maj. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant to take his army from positions west of Vicksburg, Miss., where it had been stymied for months  to crossing the river and laying a siege that closed off any escape to the east by large numbers of Confederate soldiers now trapped in the river city.

Effective but time-consuming.

More dramatically, at New Orleans, then Capt. David Glasgow Farragut didn't wait for the Army and blasted his way past the forts below the Confederacy's largest city and most important trading port to capture the city with ocean-going frigates in the spring of 1862.

Official Washington loved that dash and rewarded Farragut with promotion.  The Navy Department wanted more of it. Its leadership thought it had just the man, Capt. Samuel F. DuPont, who had captured Port Royal, S.C., and turned it into the base for the Atlantic blockade. And, more to the point, he would have ironclads. 

At Charleston, DuPont certainly felt the heat from Assistant Navy Secretary Gustavus Fox and to a lesser extent from Navy Secretary Gideon Welles to keep his attack on the birthplace of secession an "all Navy affair." The "attack." in spring 1863" was a disaster.  The invincible ironclads of Fox's and Welles' dreams were ineffective, at best.

Mine and obstacles channeled the vessels into deadly fields of fire from artillery ashore and in the island forts.  The ironclads minus disabled Keokuk   had no choice but to retreat to safety.  Keokuk eventually sank off Morris Island. In fact, Charleston remained in Confederate hands until the last few weeks of the war when i

Vicksburg Campaign-The Navy Shells Port Hudson From the River and Land

Farragut's squadron attempting to the run the guns at
Port Hudson and the destruction of USS Mississippi.

As we approach the 150th anniversary of the Battle of Gettysburg and the vast public interest in it, let us not forget the importance of Vicksburg.  Listen to the words of a Confederate Army engineer stationed in Vicksburg, Mississippi: "I am almost sorry to hear of Lee's progress Northward; for it looks as if the importance of Vicksburg were not understood.  What is Philadelphia to us if the Mississippi be lost?" 

Union  leaders in the West understood the importance of Vicksburg and spent considerable resources to take the town.  The "siege" of Vicksburg formally began on 18 May 1862 when Mayor L. Lindsay rejected the U.S. Navy's demand to surrender. Taking Vicksburg turned out to be more than just a simple assault.  It involved a complex process of controlling not only the Mississippi River, but its secondary rivers and nearby towns that guarded the river approaches. One of these towns near Vicksburg was Port Hudson, Louisiana.  The river town is strategically positioned on the Mississippi near the Red River.  Confederate forces used the Red River to bring supplies to Vicksburg from the west.  Thus, any encirclement of Vicksburg by Union ground forces was pointless unless Port Hudson was subdued.

The first major move on Port Hudson was to suppose to be a joint Army-Navy effort between Admiral David Farragut and Major General Nathaniel Banks.  However, Farragut grew tired of Banks' sluggish movements and delays. Since he took New Orleans with no ground forces, Farragut somewhat arrogantly believed he could push past Port Hudson and seize control of the Red River-Mississippi River junction with just his ships. 

Gunners from USS Richmond
prepare to fire the ship's forward
Parrott Rifle at Port Hudson

With USS Hartford in the lead, Farragut's seven ship squadron steamed up river in pairs with USS Mississippi bringing up the van of the squadron alone. The operation did not go well as all the seven ships ran aground as they attempted to hug the west bank of the river.  Hartford and Albatross got free and under the cover morning fog successfully passed the guns.  The other five were not so lucky as the wind blew away the fog.  Four of the ships received heavy damage, but successfully retreated back down stream. 

Mississippi, however, took several critical hits, caught on fire and sank.  The frigate's executive officer and future Admiral of the Fleet, Lieutenant George Dewey stayed on board long enough to spike the guns.  Thus ended the career of one of the Navy's most famous ships.  Farragut did not hear about Mississippi's demise until he read about it in local newspapers.  The movement was not one of the admiral's finest hours.

After that operation, the Navy was much more cautious and respectful of Port Hudson's defenses. Both Union and Confederate forces settled in for a long siege.  Banks' forces eventually encircled Port Hudson on the eastern side and U.S. Navy ships bombarded the town from positions down river.  

"Battery No. 10"-The Navy contributed four IX-inch
Dahlgrens to the Army's eighty-nine gun siege train
that encircled Port Hudson.  Sailors from USS
 Richmond manned the battery.

Steam sloops such as USS Monogahela (manned by both Dewey and  another Spanish-American War hero, Winfield Scott Schley) and Richmond, along with the ironclad USS Essex rotated in and out of the bomb line. The mortar schooner squadron that allegedly worked so well at New Orleans, returned from Hampton Roads and also began a steady bombardment of the town. 

After several failed assaults by Union ground forces on Port Hudson's extensive fortification network, Banks decided to blast the Confederates out of their position.  He brought in over eighty heavy guns to shell the Confederate defenses.

The Confederate defenders, however, had their own heavy guns.  Of particular note was a 10-inch Columbiad, which inflected heavy loses on Union ground forces.  Having nothing to respond to such firepower, the Army turned to the Navy for help.
The Navy had an answer. Originally intended for a new fort at Head of Passes (where the  Mississippi River empties into the Gulf of Mexico), the Navy had four IX-inch Dahlgrens in surplus.  The Navy agreed to transfer the weapons to the Port Hudson siege lines.  Labeled "Battery No. 10," gun teams from Richmond manned the weapons and took up positions about a mile east of the town. 

Counter Offensive at Galveston and the Capture of Harriet Lane



USN map of the 1863 action at Galveston

Confederate offensives took a sharp increase in 1863.  On the western side of the Confederacy, "Prince John" Magruder kicked things off for the CSA with a New Year's Day assault on Union forces in Galveston, Texas.   Union forces captured the port of Galveston in October 1862, effectively blockading much of Texas.  When Margruder arrived from Virginia to command ground forces in Texas, he found all ports except Brownsville under the control of Union forces.  He set out to change that. Working with Texas cavalry and local steamboat captains, Magruder converted the steamers Bayou City and Neptune into makeshift gunboats protected by cotton bales.

Patrolling off the coast of Galveston was a squadron of six U.S. Navy ships: USS Westfield, Clifton, Owasco, Sachem, the sailing yacht Coruphues, and the former Revenue Cuter paddle steamer Harriet Lane.  In addition, 260 soldiers from the 42nd Massachusetts Volunteers occupied the wharf. 

Watches aboard Clifton and Westfield spotted Neptune and Bayou City in the moon light at 1:30 a.m., but discounted them as harmless civilian steamers. Soon after, pickets lines of the 42nd began passing back reports of Confederate artillery advancing on the wharf.  Confederate ground forces launched their assault on the wharf at 3 a.m.  Though they had no artillery attached to their unit, the 42nd had the Sachem and Corypheus backing them up with light Parrot rifles. 

Capture of USS Harriet Lane

An hour later, Neptune and Bayou City made their advance on Galveston and Harriet Lane turned to engage the two ships.  A newspaper later reported that someone on shore called out to Bayou City's captain during the advance to give them a "New Year's present."  The captain replied, "Well, here goes your New Year's present!" and pulled the lanyard on his ship's 32-pounder.  The gun exploded in the face of the captain, killing him instantly. 

Neptune then rammed Harriet Lane.  Lane returned fire on Neptune, causing Neptune to take on water and eventually sink.  Bayou City also rammed Harriet Lane and sent boarders to storm the Union vessel.  With revolvers in hand, Harriet Lane's commanding officer, Commander J.M. Wainwright, fought the boarders until he was shot in the head.  The rest of Lane's company soon surrendered after that.

Scuttling of USS Westfield

The rest of the U.S. squadron was a confused mess.  Westfield ran aground amidst the confusion.  Owasco also ran aground, but attempted to sink the now captured Harriet Lane with gunfire.  Corypheus' company came under a hail of musket fire from shore, doing all they could to keep their heads down while they sailed out; Clifton went to help Westfield, then turned around to help Harriet Lane.  But, by this point Harriet Lane had a white flag of truce flying above her.  Instead of trying to recapture Lane or destroy her, Clifton's commanding officer accepted the truce. 

Westfield's commanding officer saw what he believed were more Confederate warships.  He lost his nerve and ordered the ship to be scuttled.  All of the men of the 42nd Massachusetts were killed or captured when Confederate forces overran their positions.  The Confederate ground forces also captured two coal barks.   Clifton became the senior ship in the squadron.  Her commanding officer ordered the remaining Union ships to withdraw to New Orleans.

Admiral Farragut was naturally furious at the loss.  He had Clifton's commanding officer brought up on charges for ordering the withdrawal and failing to recapture Harriet Lane.  The decisive victory led Magruder to proclaim the blockade lifted.  The USS Brooklyn arrived a few days later to put the blockade back in place.

 Read Farragut's official report to Secretary Welles here.

Playing With Fire off the Cuban Coast, October 1862

A route frequently used by Anglo-Confederate blockade runners went from Matamoros, Mexico to Havana, Cuba, ending at Mobile, Alabama.  The ships would pick up Texas cotton in Matamoros shipped across the Rio Grande from Brownsville, Texas. They would then steam east towards the Cuban coast, hug the coastline as close as possible, and then enter the friendly, Spanish-controlled port of Havana.  From Havana, the ships would pick up guns, ammunition, and other manufactured goods and make a run towards Mobile.

Commander Charles S. Hunter oversaw the converted merchant steamer USS Montgomery, which patrolled off the coast of Havana.  One ship in particular Hunter was on the look out for was the blockade runner General Rusk (sometimes referred to as Blanche).  The ship already navigated the Matamoros-Havana-Mobile run six times. 

On the seventh attempt, one of Montgomery's watches spotted her trying to enter Havana with 569 bales of cotton (retail price of $142,000 on the English market).   Unfortunately, General Rusk's captain misread his charts and ran aground.  The captain, believing that since he was in Spanish waters and flying a Spanish flag, thought he was safe.  He was not. 

Hunter was under the impression he had Admiral Farragut's personal endorsement to get this particular blockade runner by any means necessary.  U.S. Navy sailors from two of Montgomery's small boats formally captured General Rusk.  During the boarding master's interrogation of General Rusk's captain, the ship mysteriously caught on fire, forcing everyone off the boat.  Though he did not capture the ship, Hunter thought himself a hero for finally eliminating the elusive blockade runner. 

USS Montgomery, a converted steam merchant ship and
vessel of Commander Charles S. Hunter.

A week later,  watches spotted the blockade runner Caroline in the Gulf of Mexico.  Montgomery fired seventeen shots and struck Caroline twice, who stopped running after being hit. This capture was a bit more clear cut as the ship was carrying French muskets and ammunition.  She was also caring thirty-two five-gallon demijohns of Cuban rum.  Hunter felt "it was his moral duty" to get rid of the rum immediately.  He had his company open up all the bottles and pour the alcohol out.   

Caroline's master objected to being seized, stating he was, like General Rusk, a Spanish ship bounded for Matamoros.  Montgomery's boarding officer is to have replied, "I do not take you for running the blockade, but for your damned poor navigation. Any man bound for Matamoros from Havana and coming within twelve miles of Mobile light has no business to have a steamer."

Blockade runner Caroline, later USS Arizona

For the next several months, Hunter thought himself a "master hunter" of blockade runners, capturing one more and was waiting to chase CSS Florida.  That was until he received a court-marital summons.  While Hunter was crowing, the Spanish government threatened to declare war over Hunter's violation of its territorial waters by capturing and burning General Rusk.  Secretary of State Seward was forced to issue a formal apology and pay reparations of over $300,000.  While the court-martial board cleared him of charges military misconduct (for burning the ship), it found him guilty of violating neutral waters and removed him from service. 

Hunter's brother officers, including Farragut, believed Hunter was getting a raw deal and fought to have him reinstated.  But the  civilian authorises rejected their arguments.  Sixty years later, Admiral Albert Gleaves wrote a passionate defense of Hunter in the Proceedings of the Naval Institute.  Gleaves concluded, "do what is right, even when you know its wrong."

Farragut's Punitive Raid on Donaldsonville

If siege craft could be classified as an occurrence where ancient rules of war still applied and honor still existed, guerrilla/partisan activity would be its polar opposite.  The activity tended to bring out the worst in partisans trying to do anything they could to harass an enemy that possessed superior firepower and numbers.  Likewise, the uniformed sailor/soliders' attempts to suppress the partisan activity bore little fruit.  This led to more extreme measures.

One of many such exchanges came to a head in early August 1862 in Donaldsonville, Louisiana.  Located on the Mississippi River between New Orleans and Baton Rouge, Donaldsonville once served as Louisiana's state capital in the 1830s.   Farragut's ships and U.S. Army transports frequently passed by the town, moving back and forth from the front lines near Baton Rouge. 

As the Union ships passed by Donaldsonville, a group of "partisan rangers," led by local businessman Captain Phillippe Landry, frequently took pot shots at them. On the evening of August 6, 1862, Landry's men escalated their attacks by firing several volleys of musket and small cannon fire at the Union army transport Sallie Robinson.   A few minutes later, a second group of partisans fired at another ship that they thought was an unarmed transport.  It turned out to be the powerful steam sloop USS Brooklyn.  The warship responded with one shot from her aft pivot IX-inch Dahlgren, but the partisans had already withdrawn. 

Upon being told of these attacks, Farragut issued a short and stern warning to the citizens of Donaldsonville "Every time my boats are fired upon, I will burn a portion of your town." 


USS Hartford

The citizens either didn't receive the message or willfully ignored Farragut.  The partisans attacked the transport St. Charles the following night.  True to his word, Farragut advised Donaldsonville to evacuate all women and children on August 10. USS Hartford and Brooklyn then opened fired.  The ships' gunners specifically targeted Landry's hotel, his private residence, and any other home or business of a known partisan.  Several buildings were destroyed and burned to the ground. Farragut also accepted a dozen slaves seeking freedom and seized several heads of cattle and sheep. 


As uncivilized as it seems, the punitive action worked.  Realizing that they had no effective means of fighting back against such firepower and that future partisan attack would only bring more destruction and loss of property, plantation owners from the parishes of Accession and St. James passed a resolution demanding Governor Thomas Moore do all he could to stop partisans from attacking U.S. Navy ships.  The river raids stopped and so did the Navy's retaliations.  The plantations even swore a loyalty oath to the U.S. Government (so they could keep their slaves).  However, they secretly supported the partisans' ground operations for the rest of the war. 

16 July 1862: Congress Authorizes the Rank of Admiral

On this day 150 years ago, Congress authorized the rank of Rear Admiral (Two Stars), with not more than (9) active duty officers.  David Glasgow Farragut would become the first Rear Admiral in the United States Navy.  He would later make Vice Admiral (Three Stars) in December 1864. 

These findings were originally published in the 1863 version of the Register of the Commissioned and Warrant Officers of the United States Navy.

Rear Admiral Active List, as of 1863:
David G. Farragut (Commanding West Gulf Blockading Squadron) - 16 July 1862
Louis M. Goldsborough (Special Duty, Washington) - 16 July 1862
Samuel Francis Du Point (Waiting Orders) - 16 July 1862
Charles Henry Davis (Commanding South Atlantic Blockading Squadron) - 7 February 1863
David D. Porter (Commanding Mississippi Squadron) - 7 February 1863

The retired list of Admirals is a "who's who" of the Navy's old guard.  One officer in particular, Charles Stewart, had a service record dating back to the Quasi-War with France.   He is listed in 1863's Naval Register as "Waiting Orders." 

Rear Admiral Retired List, as of 1863:
Charles Stewart
William B. Shubrick
Joseph Smith
George W. Storer
Francis H. Gregory
Silas H. Stringham
Samuel L. Breese
Hiram Paulding

In the 1878 edition of the Register, the rank of Admiral had a yearly salary of $13,000, vastly different from Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles' annual wartime salary of $8,000 in 1863.  It is interesting to note that, unlike any other rank, Admirals pay did not change with their status (i.e. at sea, on shore duty, or on leave waiting orders).  The number remained at $13,000.  The lowest paid sailor in the United States Navy was the Warrant Officer's cook, earning just $15.50 a month ($214.50 per annum).  The oddest (and poorly paid) position in 1878 was that of the apothecary, who earned $360.00 per annum.

Throughout the Civil War, the Confederacy authorized four billets to Admiral, giving two of these to Franklin Buchanan (August 1862) and Raphael Semmes (January 1865). 

Battle of New Orleans-USN Takes Over the City

With the forts bypassed and the Confederate/state ships either destroyed or put to flight, Farragut's squadron steamed north.  Smaller forts upstream were destroyed and his ships anchored off of New Orleans' docks.   As there were no fortifications or garrison guarding the city proper, Farragut demanded the city surrender.  However, the U.S. Army's ground force was not ready to provide immediate help.  So, the Navy did it alone.  What happened over the next four days was a mixture of anxiety and awkwardness. 

Captain Theodorus Bailey, commander of Farragut's second division, adamantly volunteered for the job.  Accompanied only by his aide, Lieutenant George Perkins, Bailey marched past hostile crowds to City Hall looking for someone in charge to make his demands.  He could not find anyone and returned to Hartford. This was the first of several attempts by the U.S. Navy to get the city officials to accept the fact that there was a large squadron of U.S. Navy ships in the Mississippi River and they were not going away.

Attempt number two was tried by Hartford's Lieutenant Albert Kautz (who wrote a very detailed account for Battles and Leaders), a midshipmen, and twenty Marines.  Assisted through the crowds by the City Guards (the city's police force), the Mayor of New Orleans granted Kautz an audience under truce.  After reading Farragut's written demand to surrender, the Mayor claimed he had no military right to give up the city.  Confederate General Mansfield Lovell (a native of New York), commanding officer of Confederate ground forces, also refuse to surrender on the grounds he worked for the Mayor.  New Orleans city councilmen admitted they were clueless on how to properly surrender the city. Even though local officials knew that Farragut could level the city at any time, they stalled. This went on for three days.

Finally, Farragut had lost his patience. Under the command of his chief of staff/flag captain Henry H. Bell (a native of North Carolina), all of the squadron's Marines were assembled with two boat howitzers and marched into the city towards the Custom's House on April 29.  With the Mayor standing coldly in front of one of the howitzers and the city mob looking on in silence, Kautz struck the Louisiana state flag and raised the American flag. The Marines, with the assistance of local authorities, maintained order until General Ben Butler's troops arrived in early May to assume formal occupation. As humiliating the situation might have been for New Orleans residences, the Confederacy's largest city was spared the fate that would befall other Confederate urban areas such as Atlanta, Charleston, Columbia, Jackson, Richmond, and parts of Hampton Roads.

Porter's mortar schooners - failure to meet expectations

Earlier we looked at the Mississippi River mortar boats used upriver at points such as Island No. 10 and Fort Pillow.  While suitable for the inland rivers, being little more than rafts these were not capable of ocean passage.  For the lower reaches of the Mississippi, the Navy acquired several ocean going civilian vessels to form a "bomb flotilla." 

Commander David Dixon Porter, in charge of the Mortar Flotilla, set high expectations for these craft.   As with expectations upriver, many thought the 13-inch mortars would rain destruction down upon fortifications blocking passage along the Mississippi.  Those championing the heavy mortars figured no defensive work could last more than a few hours against a deliberate bombardment.  However detractors wondered if the wooden vessels could withstand the strain.

Unknown mortar schooner - typical of the type used - note mortar between the masts (Wiki Commons)

Porter received twenty schooners outfitted with mortars.  These ships retained their civilian names upon commissioning - USS Adolph Hugel, USS Arletta, USS C.P. Williams, USS Dan Smith, USS George Mangham, USS Henry James, USS John Griffith, USS Maria J. Carlton, USS Matthew Vasser, USS Norfolk Packet, USS Oliver H. Lee, USS Orvetta, USS Para, USS Racer, USS Sara Bruen, USS Sea Foam, USS Sidney C. Jones, USS Sophronia, USS T.A. Ward, and USS William Bacon.  (The barks USS Horace Beals and USS A. Houghton are sometimes cited along with the mortar schooners, but these served as guard and stores ships, respectively). 

The main armament of the schooners was the relatively new 13-inch naval mortar, identical to the Army's Model 1861 Seacoast Mortar.  Fort Pitt Foundry in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania delivered the first of these in November 1861.  Although weighing over 17,000 pounds, the mortar could fire a 227 pound projectile over 4600 yards.  Concurrently to production, the Navy built firing platforms to accommodate these massive weapons. 

13-inch Mortar on Navy Platform (Naval Ordnance Instructions)

Unlike the smaller upriver boats, which might be maneuvered about to adjust the line of fire, the schooners required some means to traverse the weapons.  So the Navy designed a circular, pivoting platform.  To traverse the mortar, crews would raise the platform on four eccentric wheels using braking leavers.  Once raised, the crews used block and tackle to pivot the platform.  After heaving to the proper line, the crew released the eccentric brakes, lowering the platform back onto the base, thus ensuring the wheels would not bear the recoil force when fired. 

Mortar and platform on an unidentified schooner (Wiki Commons)

In addition to the mortars, the schooners carried self-defense batteries.  The larger vessels mounted two 32-pdr guns and two 12-pdr boat howitzers.  The smaller schooners carried only the 12-pdrs. 

The Mortar Flotilla arrived off the Louisiana coast in March 1862.  After reconnaissances, including work by a coastal survey team, Porter carefully placed his schooners downstream of Forts Jackson and St. Philip.  Since the schooners were lightly constructed wooden vessels, Porter made sure to keep them out of view and range from most of the Confederate guns.  And to prevent accurate indirect fire (as the Confederate garrisons had mortars of their own), the schooners camouflaged their masts with tree limbs.  The schooners tied up along the river banks at distances between 2800 and 4500 yards.  On April 18, the bombardment commenced at a planned rate of two rounds every minute during daylight hours.  On the first day, nearly 3,000 shells landed in and around the forts. 

Mortar schooners in action (from Battles & Leaders)

The mortars damaged casemates, broke levees, and dismounted some of the Confederate guns.  In Fort Jackson, the garrison huddled in casemates while the fort flooded.  The bombardment continued on for days.  Yet in spite of the impressive display, Porter's mortars did not reduce the forts to rubble as some predicted.  Instead, the Confederate defenders remained active and continued to return fire.  The mortar gunners had difficulty timing their fuses. Some shells burst too high, while others landed on the soft ground and buried too deeply.  Furthermore, Porter complained of the difficulty of spotting and adjusting fires (not unlike that encountered at Island No. 10).  The bombardment was not doing enough damage to suppress the Confederate defenders.

 

Frustrated, Captain (later Admiral) David Farragut decided to run past the forts instead of waiting for Porter's mortars to complete their task.  The mortars continued firing to cover preparations.  After Farragut forced passage on April 24, Porter continued efforts to reduce the forts.  While the mortars failed in terms of physical damage to the forts, their impact took a toll psychologically on the garrisons.  On April 29 many enlisted men in Fort Jackson mutinied and demanded the garrison surrender.  Both Confederate forts capitulated the next day. 

Summarizing the employment of mortars, Porter wrote in his official report:

If the efforts of the Mortar Flotilla have not met your expectations in reducing the forts in a shorter time, it must be remembered that great difficulties existed, first, in the soil which allowed the bombs to sink at least 20 feet by measurement before exploding; the difficulty of seeing the fort, as it is not much above the surrounding bushes, and the endurance of the casemates which were deeply covered with earth and better constructed than supposed.  But I am firmly of opinion that the moral effect of this bombardment will go far toward clearing all forts of rebels, and I draw attention to the case of Fort Livingston, which held out a flag of truce at the moment three mortar vessels appeared before it.

Certainly the mortar schooners failed to perform up to the expectations made by their proponents.  However, their detractors were not entirely vindicated.  The mortar schooners remained in service, providing support for operations on the Mississippi and with the blockading fleet right up to the end of the war.

Facing the Forts: The West Gulf Blockading Squadron

Today (25 April) marks the 150th anniversary of the fall of New Orleans. In commemoration of Union control of the Crescent City, we have begun a series of posts in coordination with the Civil War Monitor Magazine, titled “Iron Men Afloat.” For each topic covered, the CWN 150 blog will focus on the machines and technology used, while the Civil War Monitor will discuss the men (i.e. living component) involved. This is the first in an ambitious series of cross posts. For the companion post at the Civil War Monitor blog, please go HERE. 

USS Hartford at New Orleans (Library of Congress)

United States Navy 
The ships of the West Gulf Blockading faced a daunting task in April 1862.  The Navy set its eyes on New Orleans, the South’s largest city and major port. Records show that Captain David Glasgow Farragut began planning to capture New Orleans began as far back as January and February.  The future Admiral knew that taking New Orleans meant taking or running past the powerful Forts Jackson and St. Philip, situated across each other along the Mississippi River. Farragut took command of the newly created West Gulf Blockading Squadron in late 1861, arriving with his fleet in February.  This would be his first major test as squadron commander during the Civil War. The results would give him international acclaim.

The majority of focus on ship strength during the battle centers on Farragut’s flagship, USS Hartford. Built just prior to the war, the Hartford boasted steam and sail capabilities with a top speed of 13.5 knots.  This was one advantage that proved to be beneficial for sloops when compared to sluggish ironclads. The ship was by all accounts no different than any other wooden sloop-of-war created in the antebellum Navy.  Her war service record, however, made her one of the Navy’s most recognizable ships. By 1865, the ship seemed mythical. At one point in the battle (24 April), Farragut’s leadership helped save the grounded ship from a burning barge that nearly engulfed the entire ship in flames. The above print from the Library of Congress’ collection brilliantly explains the harrowing sight of battle on 24 April.  The Hartford was just one of many Union ships involved in the battle against Forts Jackson and St. Philip. The attack utilized several different ship types of the West Gulf Blockading Squadron, including sloops, schooners, mortar boats, and hastily built gunboats.

The Union plan of attack was not without its flaws.  The major obstacle standing in the way of Farragut’s fleet, besides fortifications and river barrier chain, was David Dixon Porter’s mortar ships.  Slow and relatively untested, each of the 21 mortar schooners had a single 13-inch seacoast mortar capable of hurling a 227-pound shell nearly 5,000 yards. The arched trajectory a lot the plunging fire to fall on top of the enemy target: ideal for shore-based fortifications. Although Farragut did not  ascribe to the effectiveness of the giant cannons, he would use his fleet during the upcoming engagement regardless. 

(Library of Congress)

LEFT:  Union plan of attack, sketched by William Waud. Notice the sketches of CSS Louisiana and CSS Manasseh's in the left corner of the image.






 The ongoing debate of ship vulnerability and susceptibility to shore-based fortification would be tested at New Orleans. Before April 1862, few naval engagements involved ships against heavy fortifications. Although several “gauntlets” were passed in the early months of 1862 (See “Commander Walke Runs the Gauntlet”). The Mississippi River, either at its inner corridors or its entrance, was the major objective in the West.  It was there that Farragut felt David Dixon Porter’s rag-tag mortar fleet could be utilized. If anything, the results proved to be psychologically damaging, as some of the shells with their unreliable fuses did hit the fortifications.  According to historian Chester Hearn, Porter predicted he could subdue the forts within two days of bombardment.  He did not.  During the first phase of the battle (18-23 April), Porter fired nearly 3,000 mortars over the course of five days. Civil War Monitor and CWN 150 blogger Craig Swain recently wrote about the unwieldy and inaccurate mortars for the blog.

Unadilla-Class Gunboat, 1861

Unadilla-class gunboats, commonly referred to as the “90 Day Gunboats,” were employed in every naval theater of warfare during the Civil War, from the battle at Port Royal to the triumphant Vicksburg campaign. Each ship was lightly armed with one XI-inch Dahlgren smoothbore, two 24-pounder Parrot rifles, and one 20-pounder Parrot.  The U.S. Navy used the wrought iron Parrot rifle extensively during the war, even if the design was flawed (Many of the guns burst throughout the war).  It is hard to compare the "wholesale" design of the Parrot with the tested one of Dahlgren’s, who Spencer Tucker called “the most influential figure in the development of nineteenth century ordnance.” Of the 17 ships comprising the West Gulf Blockading Squadron, nine were Unadilla-class gunboats: Cayuga, Itasca, Katahdin, Kennebec, Kineo, Pinola, Sciota, Winona, and Wissahickon.

In total, the squadron assembled below New Orleans totaled 188 guns to the 105 guns at Forts Jackson and St. Philip (75 at Fort Jackson and 30 at Fort St. Philip).  General Mansfield Lovell and other Confederate planners hoped the fortifications and ships would be enough to stave off Farragut’s wooden fleet.

Confederate Navy 
Facing the 188 guns of the West Gulf Blockading Squadron were several ironclads and cottonclad rams that comprised the Civilian-run Confederate River Defense Fleet. Three ironclads were at New Orleans at the time of the 24 April engagement: CSS Manassas, CSS Louisiana, and CSS Mississippi. Only Manassas and Louisiana were involved in the conflict, as Mississippi was incomplete at the time of battle.

CSS Louisiana

Louisiana loosely resembled many of the casemate-type ironclads used in the eastern theater like CSS Virginia and CSS Richmond. The ship was hastily built amidst pressure from the blockade and from skilled laborers. After she sank following the fleet’s passing below New Orleans, the Louisiana’s Executive Officer pointed out in the Official Records that, above all else, the ship was poorly designed for armament, making it only a formidable ship at close range. The armor of the ship did prove effective in battle. Louisiana briefly engaged with the Brooklyn during the engagement, having the Union vessels’ cannon balls bounced off the armor plating. The only major casualty of the Louisiana during its brief engagement at New Orleans was its commanding officer, Charles F. McIntosh.

CSS Manassas

CSS Manassas made notoriety earlier in the year when it thwarted the Federal blockade at the Head of Passes. Her design sparked much curiosity; so much that David Dixon Porter attempted to save the ship from sinking to examine it at the end of the battle. New Orleans merchant John Stevenson took the captured tow boat upriver to Algiers where it was converted into a revolutionary “turtle-backed” ironclad design, complete with 1.5-inch armor and chain complementing the iron ram and single Dahlgren gun.  The new ship was christened CSS Manassas.  During the battle, Manassas managed to ram the Mississippi and Brooklyn. The damage, however, was minimal. The vessel was eventually abandoned on the shore and burned.

Stacking Up
It is important to note the simplicity of the West Gulf Blockading Squadron in comparison to other squadrons or Confederate fleets. According to the National Park Service, the United States Navy suffered 229 casualties to the Confederacy’s 782. The Union Navy lost one vessel, the gunboat Varuna. The United States Navy ran the forts with no ironclad ships. The Confederate Navy lost twelve vessels during the run of the West Gulf Blockading Squadron past Forts Jackson and St. Philip. Of the three Confederate ironclads at the battle of New Orleans, none survived the end of April:

• The CSS Manassas ran aground and sunk on 24 April by steam frigate USS Mississippi.
• The crew of the CSS Louisiana set her afire to avoid capture on 28 April. 
• The incomplete CSS Mississippi was burned by Confederates to avoid capture by Farragut on 25 April. 

Perhaps it is best to take a quote from the Ironclad Board, men who were ironically assigned to employ new naval technology against wooden ships. Once you read the quote, it is as if they read straight from an after-action report at New Orleans:

“Wooden ships may be said to be but coffins for their crews when brought in conflict with iron-clad vessels; but the speed of the former, we take for granted, being greater than that of the latter, they can readily choose their position and keep out of harm’s way.”

Steam power had much more to do with the battle of New Orleans than iron-wielded machinery. With a hearty understanding of strategy and tactics, Farragut’s fleet soundly passed the Forts at New Orleans, leaving a clear path to New Orleans with no sign of reinforcements between them and the strategic and commercial center. On 25 April 1862, Farragut’s forces accepted its surrender. Although the squadron’s sailors were not made of iron, their courage was wielded and forged at the gates of New Orleans in April 1862. Read more about the Battle of New Orleans, including a complete sequence of events of the engagement, HERE.


----------------------------
Where Are They Now? 
 Bruised and battered from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, both forts remain standing, albeit more in a figurative sense. St. Philip, the smaller of the two fortifications watching over the entrance to New Orleans, is only available via boat or helicopter. Both forts are part of the U.S. National Register of the Historic Places, as well as U.S. National Historic Landmarks. The many Unadilla-class gunboats created to swell the naval register immediately following the outbreak of the war were primarily sold off to foreign countries when the war ended. As for Farragut’s flagship, the USS Hartford remained in the fleet serving with distinction for the remainder of the Civil War. Falling into disrepair, the ship sank at her Portsmouth birth in 1956.  Here is a picture of the stern emblem of the ship, which is now part of the Hampton Roads Naval Museum’s accessioned collection.