Navy 'Changed Trajectory of the War'

 

1862 illustration shows captured British blockade runners. (U.S. Navy)

 

The Navy "changed the trajectory of the war" was the way one of the nation's leading historians described the service's contribution to the ultimate Union victory in 1865.

Speaking April 16 at the United States Naval Institute's annual meeting in Washington, Dr. Craig Symonds, co-winner of the 2009 Lincoln Prize for his Lincoln and His Admirals, said the blockade of Confederate ports from the Carolinas on the Atlantic to the Texas Gulf Coast "was the largest enterprise the Navy undertook," ultimately involving more than 500 ships, more than 400 of them converted merchantmen -- "the last time that was still possible," and 100,000 men.

The Union Navy transformed itself from a fleet of 42 ships scattered around the globe or in ordinary at shipyards with a few thousand officers and experienced tars in 1861 to a technologically adept force with rifled guns, iron-plated, screw propellers, etc. operating with a "changed lower deck" of "volunteers. contrabands from the South, free blacks from the North" in 1865.

When President Abraham Lincoln announced the blockade, Symonds, a professor emeritus of history at the Naval Academy, contends that he and Secretary of State William Seward understood that it "was an act of war" and implied "a kind of recognition" of the Confederacy.

But it proved hugely advantageous for the Union.  Great Britain. while acknowledging the Confederacy as a belligerent, declared itself neutral in the North American war and by doing that effectively closed off its ports, particularly important in the Caribbean, to Confederate privateers or later its commerce raiders trying to sell off their captured "prizes."

But the reality of blockade is actually far more difficult than simply declaring it.  "You actually have to do it" over 3,500 miles of coast with 189 harbors and navigable inlets. "Maintaining it was hard work.  Blockade service [meant] days that were long and tedious ... in all weather.  Usually at night and often in rain or drizzle, the blockade runners were creeping in and out of Southern ports.

It did work on a number of levels, Symonds said, including persuading a large number of foreign ship-owners never to risk their vessels in a race for safety and riches in a Confederate harbor. The blockade caused "the slow asphyxiation" of the rebellion and "very likely made the war shorter."

With the profit motive of privateering proving to be a myth, the Confederacy turned to buying ships overseas for commerce raiding.  Led by James D. Bulloch, a onetime officer in the United States Navy and experienced merchant marine officer, the Jefferson Davis government put to sea a "dozen or so" of these ships, most notably Alabama that destroyed 284 American merchantmen over the course of the war. 

Indeed, the Confederate Navy's Civil War didn't end until November 1865 when Shenandoah returned to Liverpool, having destroyed a number of American whalers operating in the Pacific -- after Robert E. Lee's surrender at Appomattox.

The commerce raiders were an interesting story all their own.  They were officered by Confederates, but the overwhelming majority of the crew were British, Scot, Irish and French "who didn't think much" of promises of future fortunes for all when the Union threw in the towel.  "They were in it for the money" immediately. When the prize money remained empty promises and the risks great, many deserted.

Commerce raiding "was a great idea for the Confederacy" because it caused maritime insurance rates to skyrocket and caused American-flagged vessels to change registry  to avoid destruction.

But in the end, the commerce raiders "did not bring Lincoln to the negotiating table" nor did they weaken the blockade.

For the greater part of the war, the Army and Navy operated separately even when fighting in the same area. Think New Orleans; think Charleston.  Yet from the war's start on the  rivers lying west of the Appalachians to the Mississippi, combined operations proved very successful at Forts Henry and Donelson and Island Number 10 -- keeping Kentucky in the Union and splintering Tennessee. Joint operations also set the stage for Maj. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant to take his army from positions west of Vicksburg, Miss., where it had been stymied for months  to crossing the river and laying a siege that closed off any escape to the east by large numbers of Confederate soldiers now trapped in the river city.

Effective but time-consuming.

More dramatically, at New Orleans, then Capt. David Glasgow Farragut didn't wait for the Army and blasted his way past the forts below the Confederacy's largest city and most important trading port to capture the city with ocean-going frigates in the spring of 1862.

Official Washington loved that dash and rewarded Farragut with promotion.  The Navy Department wanted more of it. Its leadership thought it had just the man, Capt. Samuel F. DuPont, who had captured Port Royal, S.C., and turned it into the base for the Atlantic blockade. And, more to the point, he would have ironclads. 

At Charleston, DuPont certainly felt the heat from Assistant Navy Secretary Gustavus Fox and to a lesser extent from Navy Secretary Gideon Welles to keep his attack on the birthplace of secession an "all Navy affair." The "attack." in spring 1863" was a disaster.  The invincible ironclads of Fox's and Welles' dreams were ineffective, at best.

Mine and obstacles channeled the vessels into deadly fields of fire from artillery ashore and in the island forts.  The ironclads minus disabled Keokuk   had no choice but to retreat to safety.  Keokuk eventually sank off Morris Island. In fact, Charleston remained in Confederate hands until the last few weeks of the war when i

The Moral Courage in Risk Taking

The capture of Confederate ram Tennessee in the Battle of Mobile Bay in August 1864, the first major Union victory in 1864

The Navy was more successful in its campaigns like Port Royal, S.C. and New Orleans than the Army during the American Civil War particularly in the Virginia Theater.  According to Pulitzer Prize-winning author James McPherson, it was “partially due to the professionalism of Navy leadership in high positions."  Dr. McPherson answered these and other questions on 4 January during a speaking engagement at the Society for Military History George C. Marshall lecture series in Washington, D.C. 

James McPherson discusses the role of naval operations in the war in his most recent work, War on the Waters: The Union & Confederate Navies, 1861-1865.  Concerning his talk, he argued that “determined commanders can make [some of] their own luck," as Ulysses S. Grant and David G. Farragut did at Vicksburg and Mobile Bay, respectively. 

Both Grant and Farragut shared the "moral courage to take risks and accept failure." Citing Farragut's decision to press forward at Mobile Bay after his lead ship Tecumseh struck a mine and sank, while Brooklyn, second in formation, veered off course and stopped.  It was at this point that Farragut could have said, “Damn the torpedoes!”  He added that Mobile Bay “was the first unequivocal Union victory of 1864," followed by Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman's takeover of Atlanta and Brig. Gen. Philip Sheridan's burning of Virginia's Shenandoah Valley.  McPherson stated that these three victories secured Lincoln's re-election and the Union's determination to win the war.

Farragut knew all too well about the willingness to accept failure and take risks.  Farragut spent sixty of his sixty-nine years in the Navy.  Despite this, his loyalty came into question at the beginning of the war.  According to McPherson, he "was the opposite" of Flag Officer Samuel F. Du Pont.  At Charleston, Du Pont found himself constantly at odds with Navy Secretary Gideon Welles and Assistant Navy Secretary Gustavus V. Fox over the practicality of taking the South Carolina port "in an all Navy affair."  He wanted to do as he did at Port Royal earlier in the war.  He would be backed up this time by the latest class of ironclad Monitors and a specially constructed frigate, New Ironsides, to run the harbor's ring of batteries, forts, and waters filled with mines and deadly obstructions.

To Lincoln, Welles, and Fox, Du Pont's pessimism about the ability "to beat our Southern friend and beat the Army" in subduing Charleston sounded more and more like the letters sent by Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan's explaining why the Army of the Potomac failed to move against the Confederates after success at Antietam.

Du Pont, who spent 45 years in the Navy and served on the Blockade Strategy Board in the beginning of the war, told Fox to “think cooly.”  "There's no running the gauntlet of forts like [Farragut did] at New Orleans" as he pressed repeatedly for a combined Army-Navy operation with the soldiers taking the batteries and forts with supporting fire coming from the Union fleet in covering their attacks.

McPherson felt that Farragut believed he would "have found a way" to carry out the attack that the president and civilian Navy leadership wanted. When Du Pont finally attacked, his fleet of ironclads managed to get off 151 shots while the Confederates, having set up range finders all around the harbor, fired 2,209 rounds.  Over five hundred of those struck Union ships, sinking the ironclad Keokuk in the process.  After a council of war with his ship commanders, Du Pont, who originally considered pursuing the assault the next day, "decided not to pursue the attack."  Quoting from Welles' diary said, McPherson said that Du Pont "had a reputation to protect not to make," and like McClellan that sealed his fate.  Despite his good family name and pedigree, Du Pont was removed from command. He left his position as "a bitter and broken man unwilling to take risk."

In the public's mind and the administration's, the Navy “was expected to do the heavy work" in the taking of New Orleans, as it had at Port Royal.  Later successes, even Mobile Bay, were given little public recognition at the time, an oversight that is changing now.

Gideon Welles was also a risk taker.  He did not adhere to the Navy's reliance on seniority to promote commanders, McPherson said.  With Farragut, he found a commander who would take those risks.  When Virginia seceded, he "stood by the flag” despite his local connections.  Before leaving for New York in the spring of 1861, Farragut presciently warned his friends and in-laws in Norfolk:  "you fellows will catch the devil for this business."  Welles was not so lucky with Du Pont and Charleston. He wrote in his diary, "If anything is to be done, we must have a new commander.”  He tapped the president's naval confidante, Flag Officer John A. Dahlgren, for the position.  Dahlgren would fare little better than Du Pont at the seat of secession.

Battle of New Orleans-USN Takes Over the City

With the forts bypassed and the Confederate/state ships either destroyed or put to flight, Farragut's squadron steamed north.  Smaller forts upstream were destroyed and his ships anchored off of New Orleans' docks.   As there were no fortifications or garrison guarding the city proper, Farragut demanded the city surrender.  However, the U.S. Army's ground force was not ready to provide immediate help.  So, the Navy did it alone.  What happened over the next four days was a mixture of anxiety and awkwardness. 

Captain Theodorus Bailey, commander of Farragut's second division, adamantly volunteered for the job.  Accompanied only by his aide, Lieutenant George Perkins, Bailey marched past hostile crowds to City Hall looking for someone in charge to make his demands.  He could not find anyone and returned to Hartford. This was the first of several attempts by the U.S. Navy to get the city officials to accept the fact that there was a large squadron of U.S. Navy ships in the Mississippi River and they were not going away.

Attempt number two was tried by Hartford's Lieutenant Albert Kautz (who wrote a very detailed account for Battles and Leaders), a midshipmen, and twenty Marines.  Assisted through the crowds by the City Guards (the city's police force), the Mayor of New Orleans granted Kautz an audience under truce.  After reading Farragut's written demand to surrender, the Mayor claimed he had no military right to give up the city.  Confederate General Mansfield Lovell (a native of New York), commanding officer of Confederate ground forces, also refuse to surrender on the grounds he worked for the Mayor.  New Orleans city councilmen admitted they were clueless on how to properly surrender the city. Even though local officials knew that Farragut could level the city at any time, they stalled. This went on for three days.

Finally, Farragut had lost his patience. Under the command of his chief of staff/flag captain Henry H. Bell (a native of North Carolina), all of the squadron's Marines were assembled with two boat howitzers and marched into the city towards the Custom's House on April 29.  With the Mayor standing coldly in front of one of the howitzers and the city mob looking on in silence, Kautz struck the Louisiana state flag and raised the American flag. The Marines, with the assistance of local authorities, maintained order until General Ben Butler's troops arrived in early May to assume formal occupation. As humiliating the situation might have been for New Orleans residences, the Confederacy's largest city was spared the fate that would befall other Confederate urban areas such as Atlanta, Charleston, Columbia, Jackson, Richmond, and parts of Hampton Roads.

Battle of New Orleans-One Vs. A Hundred

Lt. Beverly Kennon

As mentioned in the April 25 post, the Confederate forces afloat at New Orleans were very much outgunned and outnumbered.  With resources scarce and little chance of victory, standard naval warfare dictoms would advocate caution ("Live to fight another day," etc..).  One man who must have slept through that part of his Naval Academy training was Lieutenant Beverly Kennon, the commanding officer of the Louisiana state steamer Governor Moore.

 In his post-war account of the battle, Kennon made sure everyone knew that he did not serve in the Confederate Navy, but rather in the service of the Louisiana State Navy.    Kennon originally served with the CSN, but had a major falling out with Commodore Franklin Buchanan while serving aboard CSS Patrick Henry in Hampton Roads. He resigned his commission and returned home to New Orleans.  Thus, His Battles and Leaders account of the battle is tainted with a certain amount of bitterness.  

In the account, Kennon frequently refers to the lack of coordination among afloat Confederate units.  CSN ships operated as one, but state and Confederate army vessels operated separately from them.  Even the state vessels tended to operate independently from each other.

His ship and other Confederate gunboats were anchored upstream from the forts when the battle started.  Upon seeing Farragut's squadron pass the forts and approach the Confederate ships, Kennon decided to pit his one ship up against the entire squadron.  He implies that made the decision to attack in the hopes that other CSN or LSN ships would follow his lead.  After he personally "shot [Moore's] blue light out at the masthead with a musket," to better cloak his vessel, Kennon waited near the river's shore until the right moment.  He targeted the gunboat USS Varuna and charged.   Kennon fired the ship's forward gun through his own and then rammed Varuna, twice.  The U.S. Navy gunboat began to sink.

At this point, USS Oneida, Iroquois, Pensacola, Pinola, and Cayuga came rushing to Varuna's rescue.  This still did not deter Kennon and charged towards Pensacola.   However, his executive officer, who manned Governor Moore's helm,  did not share his captain's bravery. "Why do this? We have no men left; I'll be d---- if I stand here to be murdered," he is to have said.    The XO put the ship hard astarboard, opening Governor Moore to a murderous broadside from  Pensacola.  Moore was disabled by the shots, eventually caught fire, and sank. 

Governor Moore tries to flee, while USS Pensacola levels the Confederate steamer with a full broadside.

After the war, Kennon stood by his aggressive tactics and slammed just about everyone in the Confederate Navy's leadership team for the failure at New Orleans.  To be sure, he got no help from other Confederate ships.  Stonewall Jackson did ram Varuna, but only after Varuna was sinking and while Stonewall Jackson was beating a hasty retreat towards New Orleans.  The gunboat CSS Jackson, meanwhile, did its best impression of Captain Pierre Landais and fired at anyone.  Two of Jackson's shots hit Governor Moore.

"...no matter how much pluck..."

Check out this article at the Rochester newspaper, Democrat and Chronicle, website. It briefly discusses Rochester sailors' involvement in the capture of New Orleans.

Porter's mortar schooners - failure to meet expectations

Earlier we looked at the Mississippi River mortar boats used upriver at points such as Island No. 10 and Fort Pillow.  While suitable for the inland rivers, being little more than rafts these were not capable of ocean passage.  For the lower reaches of the Mississippi, the Navy acquired several ocean going civilian vessels to form a "bomb flotilla." 

Commander David Dixon Porter, in charge of the Mortar Flotilla, set high expectations for these craft.   As with expectations upriver, many thought the 13-inch mortars would rain destruction down upon fortifications blocking passage along the Mississippi.  Those championing the heavy mortars figured no defensive work could last more than a few hours against a deliberate bombardment.  However detractors wondered if the wooden vessels could withstand the strain.

Unknown mortar schooner - typical of the type used - note mortar between the masts (Wiki Commons)

Porter received twenty schooners outfitted with mortars.  These ships retained their civilian names upon commissioning - USS Adolph Hugel, USS Arletta, USS C.P. Williams, USS Dan Smith, USS George Mangham, USS Henry James, USS John Griffith, USS Maria J. Carlton, USS Matthew Vasser, USS Norfolk Packet, USS Oliver H. Lee, USS Orvetta, USS Para, USS Racer, USS Sara Bruen, USS Sea Foam, USS Sidney C. Jones, USS Sophronia, USS T.A. Ward, and USS William Bacon.  (The barks USS Horace Beals and USS A. Houghton are sometimes cited along with the mortar schooners, but these served as guard and stores ships, respectively). 

The main armament of the schooners was the relatively new 13-inch naval mortar, identical to the Army's Model 1861 Seacoast Mortar.  Fort Pitt Foundry in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania delivered the first of these in November 1861.  Although weighing over 17,000 pounds, the mortar could fire a 227 pound projectile over 4600 yards.  Concurrently to production, the Navy built firing platforms to accommodate these massive weapons. 

13-inch Mortar on Navy Platform (Naval Ordnance Instructions)

Unlike the smaller upriver boats, which might be maneuvered about to adjust the line of fire, the schooners required some means to traverse the weapons.  So the Navy designed a circular, pivoting platform.  To traverse the mortar, crews would raise the platform on four eccentric wheels using braking leavers.  Once raised, the crews used block and tackle to pivot the platform.  After heaving to the proper line, the crew released the eccentric brakes, lowering the platform back onto the base, thus ensuring the wheels would not bear the recoil force when fired. 

Mortar and platform on an unidentified schooner (Wiki Commons)

In addition to the mortars, the schooners carried self-defense batteries.  The larger vessels mounted two 32-pdr guns and two 12-pdr boat howitzers.  The smaller schooners carried only the 12-pdrs. 

The Mortar Flotilla arrived off the Louisiana coast in March 1862.  After reconnaissances, including work by a coastal survey team, Porter carefully placed his schooners downstream of Forts Jackson and St. Philip.  Since the schooners were lightly constructed wooden vessels, Porter made sure to keep them out of view and range from most of the Confederate guns.  And to prevent accurate indirect fire (as the Confederate garrisons had mortars of their own), the schooners camouflaged their masts with tree limbs.  The schooners tied up along the river banks at distances between 2800 and 4500 yards.  On April 18, the bombardment commenced at a planned rate of two rounds every minute during daylight hours.  On the first day, nearly 3,000 shells landed in and around the forts. 

Mortar schooners in action (from Battles & Leaders)

The mortars damaged casemates, broke levees, and dismounted some of the Confederate guns.  In Fort Jackson, the garrison huddled in casemates while the fort flooded.  The bombardment continued on for days.  Yet in spite of the impressive display, Porter's mortars did not reduce the forts to rubble as some predicted.  Instead, the Confederate defenders remained active and continued to return fire.  The mortar gunners had difficulty timing their fuses. Some shells burst too high, while others landed on the soft ground and buried too deeply.  Furthermore, Porter complained of the difficulty of spotting and adjusting fires (not unlike that encountered at Island No. 10).  The bombardment was not doing enough damage to suppress the Confederate defenders.

 

Frustrated, Captain (later Admiral) David Farragut decided to run past the forts instead of waiting for Porter's mortars to complete their task.  The mortars continued firing to cover preparations.  After Farragut forced passage on April 24, Porter continued efforts to reduce the forts.  While the mortars failed in terms of physical damage to the forts, their impact took a toll psychologically on the garrisons.  On April 29 many enlisted men in Fort Jackson mutinied and demanded the garrison surrender.  Both Confederate forts capitulated the next day. 

Summarizing the employment of mortars, Porter wrote in his official report:

If the efforts of the Mortar Flotilla have not met your expectations in reducing the forts in a shorter time, it must be remembered that great difficulties existed, first, in the soil which allowed the bombs to sink at least 20 feet by measurement before exploding; the difficulty of seeing the fort, as it is not much above the surrounding bushes, and the endurance of the casemates which were deeply covered with earth and better constructed than supposed.  But I am firmly of opinion that the moral effect of this bombardment will go far toward clearing all forts of rebels, and I draw attention to the case of Fort Livingston, which held out a flag of truce at the moment three mortar vessels appeared before it.

Certainly the mortar schooners failed to perform up to the expectations made by their proponents.  However, their detractors were not entirely vindicated.  The mortar schooners remained in service, providing support for operations on the Mississippi and with the blockading fleet right up to the end of the war.

Battle of New Orleans-Sponsored by William Waud

W. Waud's image of USS Iroquios' XI-inch gun crew hit during the battle of New Orleans

Artist William Waud, brother of artist Alfred Waud, accompanied Farragut's fleet up the Mississippi River and was present during the attack on Forts St. Phillip and Jackson.  While Alfired worked as a contract sketch artist for Harper's Weekly, William worked for the cross-town rival: Frank Leslie's Illustrated Newspaper. The Library of Congress and the LOUISiana Digital Library both have several dozen digital versions of both brothers' work online.

W. Waud's image of the heart of the fight between Farragut's ships and the Confederate forts and ships.

William's depiction of New Orleans are not for the faint of heart. Unlike many other depictions of New Orleans William's images do not show a clean, orderly battle.  The viewer of the image is thrown right into the middle of the chaos.  And this was before the engraver back in New York City got a hold of William's original sketch and added his own graphic interpretation of the scene.   In this post are  four of William's drawings as published engravings in Frank Leslie's and two are rough sketches.   In one of these engravings, William made sure the public knew the risks he was personally taking to bring them accurate depictions of the war by placing himself in one of the images.

USN mortar gun crew with identifications of assignments.

The fighting top of USS Mississippi during the battle.  Notice the
sketch artist (W. Waud himself) at right, ever so calm at work.  

Destruction of the ironclad CSS Louisiana

Final victory-Farragut's fleet off of New Orleans

Facing the Forts: The West Gulf Blockading Squadron

Today (25 April) marks the 150th anniversary of the fall of New Orleans. In commemoration of Union control of the Crescent City, we have begun a series of posts in coordination with the Civil War Monitor Magazine, titled “Iron Men Afloat.” For each topic covered, the CWN 150 blog will focus on the machines and technology used, while the Civil War Monitor will discuss the men (i.e. living component) involved. This is the first in an ambitious series of cross posts. For the companion post at the Civil War Monitor blog, please go HERE. 

USS Hartford at New Orleans (Library of Congress)

United States Navy 
The ships of the West Gulf Blockading faced a daunting task in April 1862.  The Navy set its eyes on New Orleans, the South’s largest city and major port. Records show that Captain David Glasgow Farragut began planning to capture New Orleans began as far back as January and February.  The future Admiral knew that taking New Orleans meant taking or running past the powerful Forts Jackson and St. Philip, situated across each other along the Mississippi River. Farragut took command of the newly created West Gulf Blockading Squadron in late 1861, arriving with his fleet in February.  This would be his first major test as squadron commander during the Civil War. The results would give him international acclaim.

The majority of focus on ship strength during the battle centers on Farragut’s flagship, USS Hartford. Built just prior to the war, the Hartford boasted steam and sail capabilities with a top speed of 13.5 knots.  This was one advantage that proved to be beneficial for sloops when compared to sluggish ironclads. The ship was by all accounts no different than any other wooden sloop-of-war created in the antebellum Navy.  Her war service record, however, made her one of the Navy’s most recognizable ships. By 1865, the ship seemed mythical. At one point in the battle (24 April), Farragut’s leadership helped save the grounded ship from a burning barge that nearly engulfed the entire ship in flames. The above print from the Library of Congress’ collection brilliantly explains the harrowing sight of battle on 24 April.  The Hartford was just one of many Union ships involved in the battle against Forts Jackson and St. Philip. The attack utilized several different ship types of the West Gulf Blockading Squadron, including sloops, schooners, mortar boats, and hastily built gunboats.

The Union plan of attack was not without its flaws.  The major obstacle standing in the way of Farragut’s fleet, besides fortifications and river barrier chain, was David Dixon Porter’s mortar ships.  Slow and relatively untested, each of the 21 mortar schooners had a single 13-inch seacoast mortar capable of hurling a 227-pound shell nearly 5,000 yards. The arched trajectory a lot the plunging fire to fall on top of the enemy target: ideal for shore-based fortifications. Although Farragut did not  ascribe to the effectiveness of the giant cannons, he would use his fleet during the upcoming engagement regardless. 

(Library of Congress)

LEFT:  Union plan of attack, sketched by William Waud. Notice the sketches of CSS Louisiana and CSS Manasseh's in the left corner of the image.






 The ongoing debate of ship vulnerability and susceptibility to shore-based fortification would be tested at New Orleans. Before April 1862, few naval engagements involved ships against heavy fortifications. Although several “gauntlets” were passed in the early months of 1862 (See “Commander Walke Runs the Gauntlet”). The Mississippi River, either at its inner corridors or its entrance, was the major objective in the West.  It was there that Farragut felt David Dixon Porter’s rag-tag mortar fleet could be utilized. If anything, the results proved to be psychologically damaging, as some of the shells with their unreliable fuses did hit the fortifications.  According to historian Chester Hearn, Porter predicted he could subdue the forts within two days of bombardment.  He did not.  During the first phase of the battle (18-23 April), Porter fired nearly 3,000 mortars over the course of five days. Civil War Monitor and CWN 150 blogger Craig Swain recently wrote about the unwieldy and inaccurate mortars for the blog.

Unadilla-Class Gunboat, 1861

Unadilla-class gunboats, commonly referred to as the “90 Day Gunboats,” were employed in every naval theater of warfare during the Civil War, from the battle at Port Royal to the triumphant Vicksburg campaign. Each ship was lightly armed with one XI-inch Dahlgren smoothbore, two 24-pounder Parrot rifles, and one 20-pounder Parrot.  The U.S. Navy used the wrought iron Parrot rifle extensively during the war, even if the design was flawed (Many of the guns burst throughout the war).  It is hard to compare the "wholesale" design of the Parrot with the tested one of Dahlgren’s, who Spencer Tucker called “the most influential figure in the development of nineteenth century ordnance.” Of the 17 ships comprising the West Gulf Blockading Squadron, nine were Unadilla-class gunboats: Cayuga, Itasca, Katahdin, Kennebec, Kineo, Pinola, Sciota, Winona, and Wissahickon.

In total, the squadron assembled below New Orleans totaled 188 guns to the 105 guns at Forts Jackson and St. Philip (75 at Fort Jackson and 30 at Fort St. Philip).  General Mansfield Lovell and other Confederate planners hoped the fortifications and ships would be enough to stave off Farragut’s wooden fleet.

Confederate Navy 
Facing the 188 guns of the West Gulf Blockading Squadron were several ironclads and cottonclad rams that comprised the Civilian-run Confederate River Defense Fleet. Three ironclads were at New Orleans at the time of the 24 April engagement: CSS Manassas, CSS Louisiana, and CSS Mississippi. Only Manassas and Louisiana were involved in the conflict, as Mississippi was incomplete at the time of battle.

CSS Louisiana

Louisiana loosely resembled many of the casemate-type ironclads used in the eastern theater like CSS Virginia and CSS Richmond. The ship was hastily built amidst pressure from the blockade and from skilled laborers. After she sank following the fleet’s passing below New Orleans, the Louisiana’s Executive Officer pointed out in the Official Records that, above all else, the ship was poorly designed for armament, making it only a formidable ship at close range. The armor of the ship did prove effective in battle. Louisiana briefly engaged with the Brooklyn during the engagement, having the Union vessels’ cannon balls bounced off the armor plating. The only major casualty of the Louisiana during its brief engagement at New Orleans was its commanding officer, Charles F. McIntosh.

CSS Manassas

CSS Manassas made notoriety earlier in the year when it thwarted the Federal blockade at the Head of Passes. Her design sparked much curiosity; so much that David Dixon Porter attempted to save the ship from sinking to examine it at the end of the battle. New Orleans merchant John Stevenson took the captured tow boat upriver to Algiers where it was converted into a revolutionary “turtle-backed” ironclad design, complete with 1.5-inch armor and chain complementing the iron ram and single Dahlgren gun.  The new ship was christened CSS Manassas.  During the battle, Manassas managed to ram the Mississippi and Brooklyn. The damage, however, was minimal. The vessel was eventually abandoned on the shore and burned.

Stacking Up
It is important to note the simplicity of the West Gulf Blockading Squadron in comparison to other squadrons or Confederate fleets. According to the National Park Service, the United States Navy suffered 229 casualties to the Confederacy’s 782. The Union Navy lost one vessel, the gunboat Varuna. The United States Navy ran the forts with no ironclad ships. The Confederate Navy lost twelve vessels during the run of the West Gulf Blockading Squadron past Forts Jackson and St. Philip. Of the three Confederate ironclads at the battle of New Orleans, none survived the end of April:

• The CSS Manassas ran aground and sunk on 24 April by steam frigate USS Mississippi.
• The crew of the CSS Louisiana set her afire to avoid capture on 28 April. 
• The incomplete CSS Mississippi was burned by Confederates to avoid capture by Farragut on 25 April. 

Perhaps it is best to take a quote from the Ironclad Board, men who were ironically assigned to employ new naval technology against wooden ships. Once you read the quote, it is as if they read straight from an after-action report at New Orleans:

“Wooden ships may be said to be but coffins for their crews when brought in conflict with iron-clad vessels; but the speed of the former, we take for granted, being greater than that of the latter, they can readily choose their position and keep out of harm’s way.”

Steam power had much more to do with the battle of New Orleans than iron-wielded machinery. With a hearty understanding of strategy and tactics, Farragut’s fleet soundly passed the Forts at New Orleans, leaving a clear path to New Orleans with no sign of reinforcements between them and the strategic and commercial center. On 25 April 1862, Farragut’s forces accepted its surrender. Although the squadron’s sailors were not made of iron, their courage was wielded and forged at the gates of New Orleans in April 1862. Read more about the Battle of New Orleans, including a complete sequence of events of the engagement, HERE.


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Where Are They Now? 
 Bruised and battered from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, both forts remain standing, albeit more in a figurative sense. St. Philip, the smaller of the two fortifications watching over the entrance to New Orleans, is only available via boat or helicopter. Both forts are part of the U.S. National Register of the Historic Places, as well as U.S. National Historic Landmarks. The many Unadilla-class gunboats created to swell the naval register immediately following the outbreak of the war were primarily sold off to foreign countries when the war ended. As for Farragut’s flagship, the USS Hartford remained in the fleet serving with distinction for the remainder of the Civil War. Falling into disrepair, the ship sank at her Portsmouth birth in 1956.  Here is a picture of the stern emblem of the ship, which is now part of the Hampton Roads Naval Museum’s accessioned collection.

Drewry's Bluff Commemoration

Today, Laura Orr and I traveled to Drewry's Bluff to talk about some recent developments brewing with the National Park Service for the 150th anniversary commemoration.  Needless to say, we had a wonderful time walking the site and talking about the strategic importance of the battle itself, both for the Navy and the Marine Corps.  

Stay tuned for more updates and posts about Drewry's Bluff in the upcoming weeks in preparation for the anniversary.  CWN 150 staff will be there at the event.  Also, many of you may be wondering where our posts are about New Orleans.  We are in the process of doing some posts with the Civil War Monitor online blog very soon.  Keep coming back for updates!

Be sure to come to the Richmond area on May 12 and 13 to enjoy the MANY activities provided that weekend. Check out the details on the PDF at the website below. More information to come soon! (in this photo: the view of the James River from Fort Darling, taken today.)

http://www.nps.gov/rich/planyourvisit/upload/RICH-150th-Schedule-as-of-20120328-public.pdf

Looking forward to the next couple of weeks!

The Confederacy's First Ironclad and Her Attack on a Wooden Ship

As head of the U.S. diplomatic mission to the free city of Hamburg, James Anderson was quite far away from Civil War. During his daily business in September 1861, the war came to him.  One day, he encountered a German citizen who had just left New Orleans. This citizen, who had Union sympathies, provided Anderson with a sketch and description of a "turtle"-like ironclad (shown above) with a "hellish engine" under construction. The ironclad's builders, according to the information, wanted to ram the steam sloop USS Brooklyn.  Anderson quickly passed the intelligence to Secretary of State William Seward.

The man behind this turtle from Hell, was New Orleans river pilot John A. Stepheson. Having failed to get any support from the Confederate government for his idea, Stepheson raised money on his own and converted an ice breaking tugboat into an ironclad ram. He wanted to construct "such a vessel that would be able to drive off or sink the most powerful man-of-war without the use of cannon or other instrument of warfare."

Once constructed, the Confederate government came to its senses and bought Stepheson's warship. It named her CSS Manassas.  In October 1861, Confederate Naval officers took Manassas and several other small ships down the Mississippi River and attack the Union squadron  of three ships at the Head of Passes.  What is the first ironclad attack against a wooden warship, Manassas went after the steam sloop USS Richmond under the command of Commander John Pope (not to be confused with the Union Army general John Pope).  Neither side distinguished themselves in the battle as Manassas' ram attack only achieved a glancing blow, some of the rockets fired by the Confederate squadron meant to set off a series of fire rafts landed on their own ships, the Union squadron' cannon fire was erradtic, and both sides ships ran aground attempting to engage.

The Confederate squadron withdrew back to New Orelans, but not after putting enough fear into Pope to order a retreat.  "Put this matter in any light you may, it is the most ridiculous affair that ever took place in the American Navy," Gideon Welles wrote to David Dixon Porter after the war. Pope later asked for medical leave.  Welles made the request permanent and forced Pope out of the service. Manassas, in the mean time, was made ready to defend New Orelans.