Sunday, October 13, 2013

The Hillsborough River Raid



Unadilla-Class gunboat USS Tahoma.  Source:  Naval History and Heritage Command via the Florida State Archives
 
The Hillsborough River drains into Hillsborough Bay, a northeastern "arm" of Tampa Bay on the west central Gulf coast of Florida. In the fall of 1863, Lt. Commander A. A. Semmes (cousin of the famed Confederate raider captain  Raphael Semmes) of the USS Tahoma received intelligence that the Confederate steamer Scottish Chief and sloop Kate Dale were moored up the Hillsborough River, loaded with cotton and ready to run the blockade. Joined by the side wheel steam gunboat USS Adela (itself a captured and converted blockade runner), he dispatched six boats on 16 October with a landing force of 100 sailors and marines, plus officers and guides, under the command of his Executive Officer, Acting Master Thomas R. Harris.

Illustration of the side-wheel steam gunboat USS Adela by one of it's crew.  Source:  Naval History and Heritage Command.

Putting ashore near Ballast Point, the landing party made their way by land up the Hillsborough River. They at first tried to bring with them a small boat to cross the river, but eventually had to leave the boat in a hiding place, due to the difficulty of transporting it. Master Harris later wrote in his after action report:

After this we moved along very rapidly under the direction of our excellent guides, and reached the banks of the Hillsboro (sic) River about 4 a.m. October 17, having marched about 14 miles. Having stationed lookouts, the party lay down till daylight. Shortly after daylight we discovered the steamer and sloop on the opposite side of the river about 9 miles above us. The force was immediately moved to a point opposite of where they lay and those on board ordered to send a boat to us. When the boat reached [us] I sent Acting Ensigns Randall and Balch, with a suitable number of men, on board of the vessels, where they made prisoners of all except two, who escaped on the Tampa side. Hauling the vessels over, I fired both effectually.”

The landing party returned to the beach area where they came ashore, and boats were dispatched from the gunboats to retrieve them. The Confederate forces had by now been alerted to the presence of the naval landing party, and sent troops to pursue them. An intense firefight ensued between the navy men and southern troops, a mix of infantry and dismounted cavalry. Union casualties were three killed, six wounded, and four taken prisoner.


Ship's boat crewed by USN sailors landing marines at the Hillsborough River Raid re-enactment in 2010.  Source:  USS Ft. Henry web site.


Friday, October 4, 2013

Rowboats, Davids target New Ironsides


(Image from United States Navy Library)
 
Glassell first tried to attack New Ironsides from a rowboat, but the development of the Davids held far more promise of success in destroying the Union's largest warship in Charleston.
 
Navy Lieutenant W.T. Glassell was furious that his faithful service was being questioned when he landed in Philadelphia in early 1862.  He was coming off a long tour that had taken him and the crew of 25-gun screw sloop Hartford to the East Indies Squadron. Even when threatened with imprisonment, he insisted that the oath he already had taken to uphold the Constitution was more than sufficient for now. 
Although he wrote out a letter of resignation dated Dec. 4, 1861, it was never delivered. In these testy days following First Manassas and Ball’s Bluff, a Virginia-born officer’s word was not good enough.  He was “dismissed” from the Navy in December. Little could the Union authorities who cashiered him after 15 years of service and sent Glassell to Fort Warren in Boston harbor without trial know that they soon would be fighting one of the Confederacy’s most daring officers in a nasty new kind of war.

Long after the war, Glassell wrote that those eight months hardened him in such a way that “even President Hayes would now acknowledge that it was my right, if not my duty to act the part of the belligerent” after being exchanged as a prisoner of war in a conflict he hadn’t then joined.

 Now, the 30-year-old left the rank of the neutrals and accepted a lieutenant’s commission in the officer-rich and ship-poor Confederate Navy with orders to report to Charleston.  From the time when the South Carolina  port city hosted the convention that took the state out of the Union in December 1860 through the almost 34-hour bombardment of Fort Sumter in April 1861, punishing and recapturing Charleston assumed an intensity in the Lincoln administration’s war plans that rivaled the “On to Richmond” cry of the North’s newspapers.

Glassell was entering the cockpit of the asymmetric defensive strategy of the chastened Gen. P.G.T. Beauregard, still a hero in the Low Country for Sumter and his victory at First Manassas. President Jefferson Davis had found Beauregard irritating as a commander outside of Washington and irascible as a commander in the West.  He used the general’s unasked for leave to recuperate from the battle strain of Shiloh and the evacuation of Corinth as the reason to oust him from command of the Army of the Mississippi in late June 1862.


The “Little Creole” took his time that September in studying the defenses already in place after being  ordered to what seemed a backwater in a shooting war. But the reception he received upon his arrival from citizens and authorities like Governor Francis Pickens soothed his feelings. He would do his best in Charleston until he received orders to again lead troops into battle. Barely waiting for his predecessor John C. Pemberton to take command of forces near Vicksburg, Beauregard wanted more and better obstructions – from ripping up the city’s cobblestone streets to slow down invaders on the water to laying mines carefully to channel old and new classes of “iron sea elephants” into the large guns of expanded batteries and reinforced forts to running rope lines from land point to land point to snarl screw propellers in the harbor.

Somewhat surprisingly from a career Army officer, an artillerist and engineer, he had an open mind when it came to almost all things naval – be they ideas on mounting spar torpedoes on row boats, building submersibles, and submarines to attack blockaders, and sending the city’s two harbor defending ironclads on a daring night attack on the Union fleet. Following the military dictum, when in charge, be in charge, he didn’t hesitate to wrest control of men and equipment when he believed it necessary to defend not only Charleston, but Savannah and coastal Georgia, and Florida.

One middling young naval officer, Glassell, played a leading role in many of these episodes. His entry into the world of “destructionists and capturers” began conventionally enough as deck officer in charge of ironclad Chicora’s first division.  In a combined attack with ironclad Charleston Jan. 30, 1863, on the Union fleet to raise the blockade at least temporarily.  If he had been asked how to attack under the cover or darkness in an ironclad, Glassell’s answer would have been simple. Ram the wooden blockaders at “full speed.” Instead “older and perhaps wise officers” ordered him to fire on Keystone State as it was bearing down on Chicora. His division’s shot killed 21 Union sailors, wounded another 15, and Keystone State’s flag was taken down in surrendering, but in the fighting was raised again and ship sailed away.

Glassell and Captain Francis Lee, an Army engineer, realized that time was not on the side of the Confederacy in Charleston harbor.  As shipyards in and around the Ashley and Cooper rivers struggled to find engines, armament, and iron plating for Southern ironclads like Chicora, that the Union could build 10 ironclads “of a superior class almost invulnerable to shot or shell.”  Lee by then was experimenting with a spar, a long pine pole, attached by socket to a rowboat, making it maneuverable; and at the end of the pole was a torpedo with “thirty or fifty pounds of explosives” that was under six to seven feet or water.  The idea was ram the spar into a ship below its waterline and the iron plating the operator in the boat’s front would be shielded by iron from expected gunfire from the ship’s deck, then set off the torpedo and safely back the boat away.

 “I believed it should be our policy to take immediate steps for the construction of a large number of small boats [with engines] suitable for torpedo service and make simultaneous attacks … before the enemy should know what we were about.”

At 61 and with more than half a century in the Navy, Commodore Duncan Ingraham, commander of naval forces in Charleston, dismissed Glassell’s “new fangled notions” out of hand. But the lieutenant pressed on – knowing where he could find the money in Charleston to build those deadly rowboats. He went to “my friend,” George A. Trenholm, one of the wealthiest men in North America and the head of the South’s largest trading firm and its financial agent in Europe.

 While Trenholm provided the money for the rowboats, Ingraham held firm against wild notions of any kind.  This time, citing Glassell’s age and rank, the commodore said he was not qualified to lead an expedition of this size.  He could command a boat in Ingraham’s view, but still the ranking officer did not authorize an attack on the lieutenant’s target of choice, Powhatan, an 11-gun paddle steamer. Glassell’s persistence eventually paid off on March 10, 1863.


At 1 a.m. with “the young moon gone down,” he and six other men set off on the “ebb-tide in search of a victim.”  He ordered his men to keep rowing even if they were discovered “until our torpedo came in contact with the ship.”  Several hundred yards away from the target, voices from the deck demanded to know “What boat is this?”  Glassell shouted back nonsense “and stupid answers” as he ignored repeated orders to stop or they would be fired upon .  “I trusted they would be too merciful to fire on such a stupid set of idiots as they must have taken us to be.”

As they closed within forty yards, aiming for the a spot just below the gangway on Powhatan’s port side, James Murphy suddenly backed his oar stopping the rowboat. At that instant, Glassell didn’t know why Murphy did what he did, but soon enough the other men stopped rowing and the rowboat “drifted with the tide past the ship’s stern.”  The Union deck officer and sailors now armed with rifles were taking no chances and kept shouting to Glassell to stay where he was and were ready to launch a boat of their own.

Murphy, who a few weeks later deserted, threw his pistol overboard and scrambled to grab the pistol of the man next to him but failed.  Glassell believing he “never was rash, or disposed to risk my life or that of others” drew his weapon and ordered the men to cut loose the torpedo so they could escape.  The men quickly followed his command and began rowing quietly but “with all their strength” away from their intended target.

Back in Charleston shortly after daylight, Glassell believed that spies ashore had tipped the Union Navy off to the torpedoes but counted himself lucky that he had only lost one torpedo and no men.  Steam power was the way to attack.  He didn’t want to take a chance on having another Murphy, who at first appeared ashamed, foil well-laid plans. For now, Glassell’s work in the Low Country was done as he was ordered to Wilmington to complete the ironclad North Carolina.


While Ingraham moved into more administrative duties, Glassell’s commander aboard Chicora, Captain John Randolph Tucker, took over active operations.  About a decade younger than the commodore but with 37 years of naval service, Tucker believed in the spar torpedo, especially against the gathering number of Union monitors.

Thirty miles up the Cooper River from the city on Dr. St. Julien Ravenel’s hidden away plantation, Theodore Stoney, another of the principals in the Southern Torpedo Company, was rushing to complete the privately-built and paid for but with Beauregard’s blessing cigar boat. Named David, the submersible with its discarded locomotive coal-burning engine, unseasoned wood covered hull with metal plating wasn’t a work of art, but its stealth on dark nights and armed with a spar torpedo made it a formidable opponent of even the Union’s most powerful ship  New Ironsides, which repeatedly pounded Confederate fortifications during the siege.

Stoney’s and Ravenel’s work may have been isolated, but there were others like James McClintock and Horace L. Hunley in Charleston busying themselves in constructing special “torpedo-boats” whose work “were curious things to a landsman’s eye” in and around the city. As patriotic as they were, the private inventors also had a $100,000 incentive provided by Trenholm’s company to sink New Ironsides or Wabash and $50,000 to sink any of the monitors.

With a new land and sea attack likely on the sea island batteries and forts and Charleston itself, Glassell was ordered back South, not for his services but to return the eight men he had with him to service on the gunboats in the harbor.  “There was nothing in particular for me to do.”

How Glassell knew Stoney he doesn’t make clear, but it was probably through Francis Lee.  Nonetheless, he called him “my esteemed friend.”  At a meeting in Charleston, Stoney said that the David had been shipped to the city by rail and was being finished in the port.  James Stuart, who used Sullivan as his last name to conceal his identity,  agreed to be the fireman.  J.W. Cannon came aboard as pilot.

Glassell volunteered to help with the trial work.  Already, J.H. Tomb volunteered his engineer services. Lee was available to work on the copper torpedo that was to be loaded with 100 pounds of rifle powder and “provided with four sensitive tubes of lead, containing explosive mixture.” The spar projected about 14 feet from the front of the now bluish painted submersible.

Being the prepared commander, he took on four double-barreled shotguns and as many revolvers as extra armament and four cork life preservers as they began their trials.  The David reached speeds of six or seven knots. He also knew from the interrogation of deserters and prisoners that the fleet was expecting some kind of torpedo attack, likely based on his attempt on Powhatan and earlier try at New Ironsides. That meant the shotguns would likely have to take out the officer of the deck to succeed. There also would be riflemen rushing to the vessel’s side and possibly canister or grape shot as the attack rolled on With all that in place, Tucker signaled his approval of an attack at Glassell’s discretion, so did Beauregard.  But a rocket from Richmond landed ordering the lieutenant back to Wilmington.  “This was too much!,” and he now let Tucker “make my excuses to the Navy Department.”

Shortly after a starlight night fell on Oct. 5, 1863 and on the ebb-tide with a light breeze from the north, Glassell and his men headed out from the Charleston wharf.  The water was smooth as he headed for New Ironsides attack.  They slipped unseen past the picket boats near Fort Sumter, and Glassell could see the Union armada at anchor between the David and the camp-fires of 20,000 Union soldiers on Morris Island.  This was what he had imagined in the aborted rowboat attack.  The damage that could have been done then couldn’t compare to the havoc ten to a dozen Davids armed with spar torpedoes could have done this night. It was what he was thinking as he waited for the 9 p.m. signal gun firing to launch the attack on “the most powerful vessel in the world,” an exaggeration.

The David was off the ship’s starboard side. Glassell took charge of the helm from the pilot. He was sitting on the deck and working the wheel with his feet aiming for a spot near the gangway and a shotgun at the ready. He handed the pilot a double-barreled shotgun. He ordered the engineer and fireman to stay below and give the David as much steam as possible.

About 300 yards away, a sentinel spotted the David and began hailing it. “I made no answer.”  The officer of the deck demanded, “What boat is that?” as the submersible closed to within 40 yards.  Glassell fired the shotgun severely wounding the officer named Howard in the groin and the acting ensign died three days later.  He then ordered the engine stopped.  “The next moment the torpedo struck the vessel and exploded” then the David plunged violently.  But instead of going off at six to seven feet under water, the torpedo exploded about three feet below the waterline where the iron was 4 ½ inches thick backed by 27 inches of wood. The explosion, however, caused a huge column of water to wash over the deck and down the hatchway dousing the fires. Glassell told his men that their only chance for escape was to don the life preservers and swim for it.

Rifle and pistol fire rained down from the New Ironsides.  A nearby monitor now joined the fight.  For more than a hour, Glassell struggled with the cold and the wind when a boat from a transport hauled him out of the water and “to their surprise” found “they had captured a rebel.” They took him to Admiral John Dahlgren, the ordnance genius now commanding the Union Navy at Charleston who sent him to Ottawa.  Glassell was immediately recognized there by its commander, William Whiting. Whiting explained that his orders were to put Glassell in chains and double irons if he was obstreperous. Glassell said that he would adjust to the circumstances of his capture. Whiting appealed to Dahlgren to give the Confederate a parole on the promise not to escape. Sullivan got to the chains of New Ironsides where he was rescued and then imprisoned. 

Unknown to Glassell, Cannon, who could not swim clung to the David as it drifted slowly away from the large warship.  “Seeing something in the water, he hailed and heard, to his surprise, a reply from Engineer Tomb.” Tomb reported that he found “no quarter would be shown, as we called out that we surrendered.”  They re-started the fires and Cannon, winning for “himself a reputation” as a heroic pilot, headed for the city. Even though they were fired upon several times, they made it safely to Atlantic Wharf about midnight.

Glassell was on his way back to Forts Lafayette and Warren where he was held for more than year.  During this yearlong confinement, he was promoted for “gallant and meritorious service” as the Confederacy was sinking inexorably into defeat.  New Ironsides was pulled off station and spent months in dry-dock repairs. As Beauregard’s biographer wrote, “The Ironsides never fired another shot (on the coast of South Carolina) after this attack upon here,” but it returned in time to attack Fort Fisher and close the port of Wilmington.

Like Admiral Samuel F. DuPont before him, Dahlgren never succeeded in blasting Charleston in submission.

Long after the war, Glassell who remained a bachelor and moved in 1866 to a quiet life raising citrus in California wrote, “The time has arrived when I think it my duty to grant pardon to the government for all the injustice and injury I have received.”

 

Sources:

G.T. Beauregard, “Torpedo Service in the Harbor and Water Defenses of Charleston,” Southern Historical Society Papers, Vol. 5, http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A2001.05.0040%3Achapter%3D2.10%3Asection%3Dc.2.10.38%3Apage%3D145, pp. 147-162.

George E. Belknap, “Reminiscent of the Siege of Charleston, Papers of the Military Historical Society of Massachusetts, Vol. 12, Google e-Book, pp. 190-198

Donald J. Caney, The U.S. and Foreign Navies in 1860,” excerpted from Mr. Lincoln’s Navy, www.navyandmarine.org/ondeck/1862foreignnavies.htm.

Jefferson Davis, Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government, Vol. 2, DaCapo paperback, 1990, p. 175.

John Witherspoon Dubose, Lieut. William T. Glassell of Alabama, Confederate Veteran, May 1916, google e-Book, pp. 193-195.

S.F. DuPont, Official Dispatches and Letters of Rear Adm. S.F. Dupont, Google e-Book.

David C. Ebaugh, “On the building of ‘The David,”’ South Carolina Historical Magazine, Vol. 54, No. 1, January 1953, pp. 32-36.

W.T. Glassell, “Reminiscences of Torpedo Service in Charleston Harbor,” Southern Historical Society Papers, Vol. 4, pp. 225-235.

W.T. Glassell, W.T. Glassell and the little torpedo boat “David,” Los Angeles, 1937 in Museum of the Confederacy collections in Richmond.

John A. Hamilton, “General Stephen Elliott, Lt. James A. Hamilton and Elliott’s Torpedoes,” Southern Historical Society Papers,Vol. 10, April 1882, pp. 183-186.

Johnson Hagood, Memoirs of the War of Secession, Google e-Book, 1916, pp. 191-193.

Horace Edwin Hayden, A Geneaology of the Glassell Family of Scotland and Virginia, Google e-Book, pp. 30-32.

John Johnson, The Defense of Charleston Harbor 1863-1865, Google e-Book, Appendix B and F.

Isabella Middleton Leland, editor, “Middleton Correspondence (Continued),” South Carolina Historical Magazine, Vol. 64, No. 4, October 1963, pp. 212-219.

Official Records of the War of the Rebellion, Ser. 1, Vol. 14, pp. 610-640 (Union and Confederate accounts).

William Harwar Parker, Recollections of a Naval officer, 1845-1861, Google e-Book, pp. 27-32, 311-316.

Alfred Roman, Military Operations of General Beauregard, Vol. 2, DaCapo Press, 1994 reprint, pp. 12, 2123, 31, 58, 73, 77-80, 181-183, 445.

B.J. Sage, Organization of Private Warfare, Bureau of Destructive Means and Measures, Bands of Destructionists and Captors, privately printed, probably late 1863, Library of Congress Rare Book Collection.

J. Thomas Scharf, History of the Confederate States Navy, Random House Value Publishing, New York, 1996 reprint, pp. 758-760.

Augustus T. Smythe, “Torpedo and Submarine Attacks on the Federal Blockade Fleet of Charleston during the War of Secession, 1907 Yearbook of the City of Charleston, Google e-Book, pp. 53-64.

“St. Julien Ravenel, M.D.” Proceedings of American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Google e-Book, pp. 437-438

Lyon Gardiner Tyler, editor, “Glassell, William Thornton” entry Encyclopedia of Virginia Biography, Vol. 3, Google e-Book.

Stephen R. Wise, Gate of Hell, Campaign for Charleston Harbor 1863, University of South Carolina Press, Columbia, 1994, pp. 163-164.

  

 

 

 

Saturday, September 21, 2013

Life and Legacy: Thoughts and Observations from the 2013 McMullen Naval History Symposium


Well, I finally did it.  After two unsuccessful attempts to get into the holy grail of naval history, my paper was finally accepted into the 2013 McMullen Naval History Symposium.  My colleague and fellow CWN 150 blogger, Gordon Calhoun, was also accepted into the symposium for his work on the USS Cumberland. Thankfully, I went in on the diabolical scheme with two colleagues I met at the Battle of Hampton Roads Weekend in 2012, Charles Wexler and Laura Davis.    Our panel, "Forgotten Gray Jackets:" The Life and Legacy of Confederate Sailors in the Civil War, was slated to go down first thing Thursday morning.

After two long days with the Virginia Civil War HistoryMobile and the well-received lecture by acclaimed historian James McPherson earlier in the week, I was admittedly tired.  Regardless of the dark circles under my eyes, I left Virginia Beach on Wednesday in high spirits and ventured towards nap town.

Annapolis is a beautiful place.  Almost painfully beautiful.  The Academy itself is an institution of higher learning, military base, and museum.  For a student of naval history, it is the ideal place to have a conference about any and all things naval.  Walking into Mahan Hall the morning of the presentation, I scanned the crowded   and saw the top names of our field: Symonds, Browning, Still, Dudley, Bogle, Speelman, Holloway, etc.  It was awe inspiring.  I also saw something I did not expect: young faces.  Graduate students and young professionals.  Some I recognized, others I met for the first time.  Names like Mullen, Wexler, Davis, Horney, Gale, Colamaria, Burgess, etc.  Don't worry if you don't know them yet.  You will soon.  Although I only attended the conference on Thursday, I feel that the pulse of the two day event was the same.

9:30 arrived.  Over twenty individuals packed into our panel room which felt vaguely reminiscent of a heated pool.  It was so humid, I was waiting for clouds to form inside the classroom.  

The first two papers were fantastic.  Wexler and Davis are undoubtedly the top tier of a budding list of young and enthusiastic naval historians.  As a museum educator, I can simply say that I was there for the ride, if not the shock value of my own words.  It was a pleasure to be included on the same panel as they were.

For my part of the panel, I presented a paper about the role of the Confederate Navy in public memory.   Although the premise of the panel concerned relatively unknown aspects of the Confederate Navy (Guerrilla Warfare and the Palmetto Navy), mine instead shifted focus on how the memory of these sailors have subsisted over the last century and a half.

My essential argument was that social media technologies, when aided by historical scholarship, is the best way to reach the wider public arena about the role of Confederate sailors in the Civil War.  I used several examples where this has surfaced (for better or worse) in film, music, television, and of course, the Internet. Eighteen minutes and several beads of sweat later, my paper and the panel's presentations concluded.  

Dr. Daniel Sutherland, a giant in the field of Civil War history and irregular warfare, offered up his comments to each of our presentations.  Unfortunately, the hammer fell hardest on my paper.  This is not upsetting, nor unexpected.  My topic is unconventional.  Sutherland merely questioned the paper's premise.  Can all social media technologies be deemed credible?  How do modern Civil War historians weigh in on this?  These are all valid questions.  I firmly agreed with everything he said.  That was not, however, the POINT of the paper.  The point was to show the ongoing narrative of history and memory and its correlation to Confederate sea service.  The main measure of quantifying this (as we cannot do this with text) was the Internet.  It is too early to properly measure this ABOUT the sesquicentennial commemoration DURING its last two years.  In the years following 2015, many historians will undoubtedly do the scholarly work and address the major issues and concerns of the sesquicentennial.  We know this.  But the time is now.  And the only measuring stick we have to properly address these concerns at present are popular culture mediums.
CURSES! FOILED AGAIN DO-RIGHT!
Can we live in a world where Franklin Buchanan's image in Hearts in Bondage looks suspiciously like Snidely Whiplash?  Was this Machiavellian persona intentional?  Was he and the Virginia sent to Hampton Roads to put the wooden navy, the "Nell Fenwicks" of antebellum sea service, on the train tracks of destruction?  Clearly their resemblance between the real Franklin Buchanan and the actor portraying him could not be farther apart.  Dudley Do-Right references aside, these are the kinds of questions I like to ask myself from time to time.  Look in the comment section on the Youtube video of the film, and you will find plenty of individuals asking similar questions.  Sure, it's not necessarily HISTORY, but it does give us some insight into how people are curating their own perception of the war through various cultural mediums.

I think the biggest question that arose from my own paper was:  Should we embrace this media?  I find it hard to argue this, as I am using a social media technology to write this post.  The life and legacy of the Confederacy can surely be found in monographs, letters, diaries, and oral histories of a one hundred and fifty year old conflict.  That we know.  If this was not true, historians would long be out of business.  My only suggestion is that we look further into the realm of digital history to study the war.  History studies the past, it doesn't have to embrace it.
------------------------------------
Of course other things occurred throughout the rest of the day:  I spilled a full glass of water during the luncheon, Captain Hendrix gave a great talk during said luncheon and complimented my sideburns, and I got to shake hands and converse with many new people.  I have a renewed fascination in the Barbary Wars, and I might be convinced that The End of the Barbary Terror was probably the best book I read in graduate school.  In any case, I look forward to more fruitful conversations with scholars and enthusiasts in the years ahead.  

As I said my goodbyes at the front entrance of the Naval Academy Museum Thursday night, I couldn't help but smile as I walked down the steps of the building and out of Gate 3.  The smile was one of supreme satisfaction.  It was not of myself, or the body of work done by this commemoration during the last three years.  I smiled because, for the first time, I was in the company of ambitious men and women, both young and old, that readily acknowledge that the legacy of the Civil War is as much alive today as it was over a hundred years ago.  It is the reason why I got in this business in the first place.  Let me reiterate that most of the young scholars I met were women.  This is a great direction for the field. The future for Civil War history and naval history is brighter than ever.  I feel blessed that I got to see it in person.


Full Speed Ahead (or "four beers ahead"....or..."Four Bells"....or "Go Ahead"....or....whatever it was),

Matthew Eng

Sunday, September 8, 2013

Monitor aground with exposed hull: USS Weehawken's precarious September 8

With the news of the Confederate evacuation of Morris Island on September 7, 1863, both Rear-Admiral John Dahlgren and Brigadier-General Quincy Gillmore set their eyes on the next objective - Fort Sumter. Transitioning from a protracted siege, the Army was not in position to react quickly. Heavy guns were easy to traverse, but needed to properly task organize to mount an effective assault on Fort Sumter. On the other hand, the Navy was in position, and much expected, to do something about Fort Sumter. Dahlgren already had his ironclads and supporting ships inside the bar on September 7, anticipating an operation in conjunction with the Army's last assault on Battery Wagner. Now with that fortification falling without resistance, Dahlgren could turn on Fort Sumter. In the hope that General P.G.T. Beaureagard would concede Fort Sumter, Dahlgren sent a demand for the fort's surrender. When that came back negative, Dahlgren begain preparations to seize the fort:
I immediately designed to put in operation a plan to capture Fort Sumter, and as a preliminary ordered the Weehawken to pass in by a narrow channel, winding about Cumming's Point, so as to cut off all communication by that direction....
In addition, Dahlgren ordered up the other ironclads to test the batteries on Sullivan's Island. Now free from any fires from Morris Island, and only token resistance from Fort Sumter, the Federal sailors could concentrate on Fort Moultrie and supporting batteries. And while conducting that sortie, Dahlgren's captains could survey the obstructions in the main ship channel. All this was preparation for a night effort that would include boat landings on Fort Sumter. Sounded like a good plan. But as will often happen, unanticipated events upset this plan. Captain Edmund Colhoun took the USS Weehawken inshore that morning according to instructions. By 8:30 a.m. the monitor was between Cumming's Point and Fort Sumter, having marked a channel with buoys. However an hour later a flood tide pushed the Weehawken onto a shoal where she touched bottom. At high tide, the monitor got off the shoal, but Colhoun encountered more problems:
... when the tide had risen sufficiently to float her, I got underway, in obedience to your order, "to return to my anchorage near the New Ironsides," but in consequence of the shoal water she steered very badly, taking "a rank sheer" to port; she brought up on the bank in 11 feet water. In the afternoon, at high water, I failed to get her off, as also on the following morning, though every effort was made, by taking coal and shot out, with one tug to assist us.
Stuck in shallow waters, the Weehawken sat in plain view of the Confederate gunners on Sullivan's Island. While the Weehawken lay grounded on September 7, her sister monitor, USS Lehigh anchored in the main ship channel in front of Fort Moultrie to act as a shield. The USS Montauk and USS Nahant also took station to engage the Confederate batteries. The tug USS Daffodil moved up to assist with unloading coal and solid shot.
USS Montauk and Lehigh laid up after the war


At night, the tug USS O.M. Pettit attempted to pull the Weehawken off the shoal. But the monitor remained stuck fast. Early on the morning of September 8, Major Stephen Elliot commanding Fort Sumter observed,
The monitor near Cumming's Point is evidently around. Her deck is now 4 feet above water and will be some 2 feet higher at low water. Fire should be opened on her, as the thin part of her hull is probably exposed.
The Confederate batteries soon responded to this opportunity. Colonel William Butler, commanding the artillery on Sullivan's Island, opened with a slow fire. In addition to 10-inch columbiads, the 7-inch triple-banded Brooke opened on the Weehawken. In addition to Fort Moultrie, Battery Bee, Battery Beauregard, and Battery Marion, the batteries on the east end of James Island also opened on the stranded monitor. Captain John Mitchel, 1st South Carolina Artillery commanding at Fort Johnson and Battery Simkins reported:
I first turned on it the 8-inch naval shell gun on the right of Battery Simkins, and then the three 10-inch sea-coast mortars, which, with the 10-inch columbiad, had been previously keeping a steady fire on Morris Island.
Fearing the weakened carriage of the 8-inch gun would give way, Mitchel ordered the embrasure of the 10-inch columbiad modified to allow it to fire on the ironclad. He also ordered a 6.4-inch Brooke rifle mounted in Fort Johnson so as to bear on the target. Although that work was accomplished late in the day, the Brooke did fire four rounds at the Weehawken. However, the stranded ironclad was not defenseless. Firing on Fort Moultrie, the second shot from the Weehawken's XV-inch gun hit an 8-inch columbiad in the fort. The projectile then struck a stack of boxed shells. The resultant explosion killed fifteen and wounded twelve. The confusion in the aftermath of this rather lucky shot eased some of the pressure on the Weehawken.
 explosion-fort-moultrie

While the Confederates were drawing a bead on the stranded Weehawken, Dahlgren moved up the rest of his ironclads to protect it. In the early morning mist, the USS New Ironsides and five monitors moved into the main ship channel to stand between the Weehawken and Sullivan's Island.

WeehawkenBattle

The contest now resembled that of April 7 when the ironclads had first tested the main ship channel. But unlike the spring battle, the New Ironsides featured prominently in the fight. The broadside ironclad fired 483 times and in return received 70 hits while standing directly between Fort Moultrie and the Weehawken. Two 10-inch columbiad solid shots from Sullivan's Island hit in close proximity damaging one of the iron plates.

NewIronsidesDamage

Otherwise, damage was limited to shutters, stringers, and chains.

The same could not be said of the USS Patapsco. One of three hits on that monitor shot away the smokestack. With that damage, the monitor's engine could not function properly. So after firing eighteen XV-inch shells, eleven shrapnel, one stand of grape, and thirty Schenkle projectiles from her 8-inch Parrott, the Patapsco gave way to allow the Montauk to take a better position. The Montauk received 43 hits wile firing back twenty-eight XV-inch shells and seven stands of grape. The USS Passaic labored in the channel with damage from earlier action which hindered steerage and turret traverse. Yet Lieutenant-Commander Edward Simpson managed to hold her in line to fire nineteen XV-inch shells and thirty 8-inch Schenkle shells. In return the Passaic was hit 51 times, mostly from Battery Bee. Simpson summarized the damage:
Her side armor is broken through in several places, and the plates are spring off some inches from the overhang; she has now seven holes thorugh the deck, all of which make bad leaks; several hard hits on the ring around the base of the turret cause it to chafe against the deck plates under it, making it difficult to revolve the turret; several deck plates are started, and the armor at the stern is sprung apart 6 inches.
Yet, Simpson felt if required he could keep the Passaic in action. Also in the thick of the fight, the USS Nahant fired fifty-four XI-inch shells and eighteen XV-inch shells, while receiving four hits. The Lehigh fired twenty-two shells and received twenty-nine hits. Meanwhile, on the Weehawken, Colhoun refocused efforts to get his ship afloat. Right in the middle of the engagement, he sent his men to breakfast. Afterwards he ordered fires on Fort Sumter just to show the monitor was still in the fight, even if aground. Colhoun later tallied the score:
We were hit twenty-four times, doing no very serious damage; one shot struck the lower part of the overhang, passed under, made a hole about 3 inches, afterwards ascertained to be about 7 inches in diameter, and fractured the iron from the angles; the leak was soon stopped. We fired at Moultrie and Battery Bee 36 shell, at Sumter, 46; total 82.
The hit on the hull described by Colhoun may have come from the 7-inch Brooke at Fort Moultrie. However it was among the last shots ever fired from the gun. Lieutenant R.Y. Dwight, commanding that gun's section, recalled firing eleven shots at the Weehawken before receiving orders to fire on the other ironclads "with 20-pounder charges and wrought-iron bolts." After five or six of these shots, the bands on the gun cracked. In addition to that gun, two others on Sullivan's Island were disabled - the 8-inch columbiad damaged by the Weehawken and a rifled 32-pdr with a trunnion shot away.

By 1:30 p.m., Dahlgren signaled his ironclads to pull back. The tide was coming back in and he didn't wish to risk another running aground. Furthermore the tide should free the Weehawken. The withdrawal was by unit with the Lehigh remaining to cover her grounded sister. At 4:30 p.m. the Weehawken floated off the shoal and moved out into the channel.

This particular drama on September 8 thus concluded. But another was about to start. Dahlgren held to his plan to have a boat landing force assault Fort Sumter that night.

(Citations from ORN, Series I, Volume 14, pages 549, 551, 556, and 557. OR, Series I, Volume 28, Part II, Serial 46, pages 714 and 723.)