Blockade Running at Mobile Bay

Steam sloop USS Pocahontas capturing a blockade runner off Mobile Bay (source; Library of Congress archives):

In a prior post (18 February 2012) I commented on the importance of the Port of Mobile, Alabama to the Confederacy. While Mobile had a number of major advantages, primarily its rail connections to other parts of the Confederacy, it was a difficult endeavor to run the blockade into Mobile Bay, for a number of reasons.

There were three entrances into Mobile Bay: the first, a westward entrance known as Pelican Channel. Shallow depths in this entrance generally precluded its use, The second entrance was the “Swash Channel”. This was the entrance most used by runners because even though it was shallow (12 feet), it was difficult for blockaders to move “off station” to cut out runners through this entrance, plus Confederate shore batteries could cover this entrance and keep blockaders off at a safer distance. The third entrance was the Main Channel, but this was the easiest for the blockading fleet to cover. Despite these difficulties, there was a huge amount of blockade running into and out of Mobile, especially after New Orleans was captured by Union forces in April 1862. Most of the traffic came to and from Cuba, which was the main waypoint for blockade runners in the Gulf of Mexico.

Running the blockade into Mobile really came into its own after the Confederate Navy began to contract for and acquire pure “blockade runner” ships designed for this purpose (see post by Gordon on 24 July 2010). These shallow draft, fast, “stealth” ships (low profile, painted grey or black) were able to slip in and out of the port a number of times undetected, mostly at night. The major runners operating out of Mobile were the CSS Denbigh, the Donegal, and the Mary. All were British-built side-wheel steamers, specifically designed to run the blockade.

Blockaders off Mobile Bay (source; Naval History and Heritage Command photo archive):

Union occupation of Ft. Clinch, Fernandina, Florida

Ft. Clinch, at the northern tip of Amelia Island, after recapture by Union forces:

While attention focused, then and now, on the impending battle of the ironclads USS Monitor and CSS Virginia, things were really getting going in the Florida theatre of operations at this time. The Port of Fernandina, Florida, was important due to its ability to handle all but the largest US Navy ships in the entrance channel, its rail connections, and it’s proximity to the Bahamas (English territory and a key waypoint for blockade running). For a period of time (December 1861 to February 1862), the Union Navy was more occupied with shutting down the Port of Savannah, Georgia. Eventually however, interest in taking Fernandina resumed and a detachment from the South Atlantic Blockading Squadron headed toward the coast of Florida.

On 3 March 1862, US Navy and Marine forces arrived off the mouth of the St. Marys River (the Atlantic coast border between Georgia and Florida) and occupied Ft. Clinch, controlling the river mouth and the Port of Fernandina. Ft. Clinch, along with some well-constructed batteries in earthworks, was found abandoned, with a variety of artillery pieces in fine condition, along with powder and shot. The next day, the nearby town of Fernandina was occupied by Union forces. Ft. Clinch was turned over to US Army troops a day or so later. Flag Officer DuPont of the South Atlantic Squadron reported:

“. . . I learned from a contraband who had been picked up at sea by Commander Lanier, and from the neighboring residents on Cumberland Island, that the (Confederates) had abandoned in haste the whole of the defenses of Fernandina and were even at that moment retreating from Amelia Island . . . . . on receiving this intelligence I detached the gunboats and armed steamers of light draft from the main line and, placing them under the command of Commander P. Drayton, of the steam sloop Pawnee, I ordered him to push through the sound with the utmost speed, to save public and private property from threatened destruction . . .”

“Immediately on his entering the harbor, Commander Drayton sent Lieutenant White, of the Ottawa, to hoist the flag on Fort Clinch, the first of the national forts on which the ensign of the Union has resumed its (place).”

“We captured Port Royal, but Fernandina and Fort Clinch have been given to us.”


A detailed account of the occupation of Ft. Clinch and Fernandina is in a paper by Chuck Veit on the Navy and Marine Living History web site at: http://www.navyandmarine.org/ondeck/1862Fernandina.htm . Illustration source – Florida Dept. of State on-line photo archive.

Mobile in the Confederacy

Images of Mobile, Alabama. From Harper's Weekly:


After New Orleans, Mobile was the most important port on the Gulf coast for the Confederacy. When New Orleans fell in the spring of 1862, Mobile became the most important port on the Gulf coast.

There were a number of reasons for this port’s value. Mobile Bay was an embayment running in a north-south direction, with a narrow mouth at the south end, guarded by Forts Morgan and Gaines (which were both under construction at the beginning of the Civil War). The City of Mobile lay at the northern end of the bay. Any naval assault on the city would have to pass through the mouth, run the gauntlet past the forts, and then up the bay to the city. Two major river systems, the Tombigbee and Alabama Rivers, converged at Mobile and provided river access to the interior. Mobile itself had a foundery and ship building facilities, and upriver the City of Selma had additional industrial capability.

In addition, several major railroad lines linked Mobile to other parts of the Confederacy, and provided the main link between the eastern and western portions of the CSA. Mobile’s rail connections proved to be of immense military value to the Confederacy, enabling the movement of troops to critical areas where and when they were needed. Confederate Gen. Braxton Bragg, when he was garrisoning Pensacola, Florida, considered the ability to easily move troops by rail between Mobile and Pensacola, “worth 3,000 men at each end.”

Mobile was among the last major southern cities to fall at the end of the war. Yet, this defeat had no influence on the ultimate outcome of the war, as by 1865 (when the city was taken), the war was already won by the North. If the city has been taken earlier in the war (say, in 1862), historians estimate that this would have ended the war much sooner than it ultimately did. Interestingly, it seems both northern and southern leadership acknowledged the importance of Mobile and Mobile Bay, but both sides did not allocate the military resources to take or defend the city.

Through much of the war, Mobile remained an important port for blockade running, bringing critically needed supplies into the Confederacy and distributing them to where they were needed.

Salt Works Raids

Destruction of a salt works by the US Bark Kingfisher on the Florida Coast. Source: Fla. Dept. of State on-line photo archive.


As the Civil War progressed, salt became one of the most vital commodities for the Confederacy. Salt was the primary means of preserving meat at that time, along with many other critical uses. By the end of 1861, the CSA recognized that it required a reliable supply of salt, as the tightening US Navy blockade was beginning to severely cut off imports from Europe. Every year, the states making up the Confederacy required 6 million bushels of salt, over half of which was imported. Before the war, salt sold for 50 cents a bushel (sack) off the ships at New Orleans; it sold for $25 per bushel in Savannah in January 1862. By October of that year, it was selling for $140 per bushel in Atlanta. Production of salt became so important that if you worked in a salt works, it meant an exemption from conscription into the Confederate Army.

While some salt was produced along the coasts of many of the southern states, its remote coastline made Florida the ideal place for this enterprise. Salt production was particularly prolific along Florida’s Gulf coast, and a large number of Confederate salt works were established, where sources of saltwater and wood (for stoking fires) were abundant. It eventually became a major task of the Union Navy blockaders to locate and destroy these works, much of this responsibility falling to the East Gulf Blockading Squadron, responsible for most of the Florida Gulf coast. As runner after runner was captured and its cargo examined, the USN blockaders almost always found salt in the cargoes. This led the Squadron command to realize that crippling the supply of salt, both brought in by runners and produced locally, would be a major strategic blow to the Confederacy.

The "Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies" contains a wealth of reports on raids on Gulf Coast salt works during the war. I will be posting updates on significant raids on the appropriate CWN 150 dates as we hit those in the coming years. Stay tuned !!

A good overall summary of the Union raids on salt works is by my USS Ft. Henry shipmate Marine Sgt. Dave Ekardt on the Naval and Marine Living History web site at: http://www.navyandmarine.org/ondeck/1862saltraids.htm

Naval Actions at Seahorse Key, Florida 1862

The Cedar Keys, on the Gulf Coast of Florida (consisting of Way, Depot, Atsena Otie, Seahorse, Snake, and North Keys), was an important port at the start of the Civil War, in part because a newly constructed rail line connected the port to interior parts of the state and ran all the way up to Fernandina on the Atlantic coast. Seahorse Key had a light station (constructed in 1854 under the direction of then Lt. George Gordon Meade) which guided ships into the Port of Cedar Key and the nearby mouth of the Suwannee River. The Town of Cedar Key itself was located on Atsena Otie Key.

On 16 January 1862 the Union gunboat USS Hatteras hove to off Cedar Key and debarked ships boats which entered the harbor and burned four schooners, three sloops, a scow, a sailboat, and a launch. Some of the schooners were loaded with cotton, turpentine, rosin, and lumber, ready to run the blockade. The railroad depot and wharf, seven railroad cars, the telegraph station and a storehouse were also burned, and arms and equipment confiscated. To add to all this, the ship’s crew captured most of a small Confederate garrison manning a gun battery on Seahorse Key, including the officer and 13 soldiers. Needless to say, the bluejackets of the Hatteras earned their pay that day.

Not long after Hatteras departed, the USS Tahoma arrived off Seahorse Key on 1 February 1862 and commenced shelling the battery, just in case it had been reoccupied. Ships boats were sent ashore and the battery was found abandoned, with the destruction wrought by the crew of Hatteras still evident. For the remainder of the war, Seahorse Key with its lighthouse (which had been disabled by the Confederates) remained under Union control, and was used as a secondary base of operations by the East Gulf Blockading Squadron, thus depriving the Confederacy of the use of Cedar Key as a port for the remainder of the War. Thanks to the Florida Dept. of State and NHHC on-line photo archives for the illustrations.

USS Tahoma:

Key West and the East Gulf Blockading Squadron

Sketch of Key West in Civil War period

In a prior post ("The Blockade Begins"), I covered the formation of the Union Navy blockading squadrons. The blockade of the Gulf coast of the southern states was initially the responsibility of the Gulf Coast Blockading Squadron, under the command of Flag Officer William Mervine. In February 1862, the Gulf Squadron was divided into the West Gulf Blockading Squadron, under the command of Flag Officer David G. Farragut, and the East Gulf Blockading Squadron under the command of Flag Officer William McKean, who succeeded Mervine, possibly in part because Navy Sec. Gideon Welles thought the former Gulf Squadron commander not aggressive enough. The East Gulf Squadron initially had the sector of coast from Cape Florida (just north of the Florida Keys) around to St. Andrews Bay, east of Pensacola, FL. Protestations from the South Atlantic Blockading Squadron that their sector was too extensive resulted in the extension of the East Gulf Squadron’s sector of operations north up the Florida East Coast to Mosquito Inlet (present day Ponce De Leon Inlet), north of Cape Canaveral.

The East Gulf Blockading Squadron was based out of Key West, Florida, which always remained in Union hands; it never had to be re-taken by Union forces. Back in those days, the only way to get to Key West was by sea. The overseas railroad across the Florida Keys, built by Mr. Flagler, and the later overseas highway that was the old “US 1” were decades away. Key West had a US Navy base and was guarded by Ft. Taylor on the mainland and Ft. Jefferson, offshore on the Dry Tortugas. The East Gulf Squadron had low priority for the US Navy throughout the War, mainly because there were no major ports such as Wilmington, Charleston, Mobile or New Orleans, and thus little potential for major action. It was “the backwater” for USN personnel assigned to ships in the squadron. Yellow fever and malaria were constant plagues on the men who served there. Cdr. Percival Drayton, on his way from the South Atlantic Squadron over to the West Gulf Squadron to serve as Farragut’s Flag Captain, commented on his time in Key West (to a friend in the northern US):

“This is rather a dreary residence I should suppose, a sand bank varied with cocoa nut and a few other trees of the tropics, but the soil so light and sandy, as to be almost unfit for gardening purposes, and for all such products as the ordinary table vegetables your city affords their only supply, . . .”

Despite the unspectacular nature of the duty, I have to think that the efforts of the sailors of the East Gulf Blockading Squadron contributed to the success of the blockade, as much as those of any other of the squadrons. Dr. George Buker chronicled the efforts of the East Gulf Squadron in his book “Blockaders, Refugees, & Contrabands. Civil War on Florida’s Gulf Coast, 1861-1865” and Robert Macomber created a compelling story of the activities of the fictional naval officer Peter Wake of the East Gulf Squadron in three novels: “At the Edge of Honor”, “Point of Honor” and “Honorable Mention.” I highly recommend all to you.

Many thanks to Sarah, fellow CWN 150 Guest Blogger, for making available a link to Percival Drayton’s letters (I have found them fascinating) and the Florida Dept. of State on-line photo archive for the old photos and illustrations of Key West.

Fort Taylor, Key West, FL:


Navy anchorage at Key West, FL:


Navy barracks at Key West after the War:

Preparing for Battle in Northeast North Carolina



The combined fleet of the "Burnside Expedition," as it left Hampton Roads for Cape Hatteras

With Cape Hatteras secured Union ground forces in mid 1861, both sides recognized that one of the next targets would be the Albemarle Sound.  Confederate forces were under the command Norfolk-native Commodore William F. Lynch (most famous for leading a U.S. Navy expedition to the Holy Land in 1840s to prove the existence of the Biblical cities of Sodom and Gomorrah) and the 33rd Governor of Virginia, Brigadier General Henry A. Wise. The two men did not get along very well, with Confederate Army officers not taking the threat of a Union attack seriously and not shipping more heavy guns to Roanoke Island. Most of the 179 guns guarding Norfolk and Portsmouth were geared towards an attack from Hampton Roads, not from the south.

On the Union side, Brigadier General Ambrose Burnside had begun assembling a combined task force in Annapolis and Hampton Roads.  With the blessing of General George McClellan, Burnside assembled a 12,000-man division made up of men mostly from coastal towns.  He then integrated with the division, a squadron of lightly armed steam gunboats.  The U.S. Navy under the control Flag-officer Louis Goldsborough and Dublin, Ireland-native Commander Stephen Rowan assembled their own force of more heavily armed, light draft gunboats.  By the beginning of 1862, sixty gunboats and transports had assembled in Hampton Roads.

Like the Port Royal expedition, Confederate intelligence saw the task force forming in Hampton Roads.   Unlike the Port Royal expedition, they had know idea where it was going.  Speculation ran from targets in North Carolina, South Carolina, or even an assault down the Elizabeth River and Norfolk.  This was due to better secrecy on the Union side as individual ship commanders did not receive their orders until the day they left Hampton Roads.   In early January 1862, the fleet deployed.  Their target: Roanoke Island.

Dinner Party Talk that Changed the Civil War

In this rendering, President Abraham Lincoln has finished reading the Emancipation Proclamation to his cabinet. Sitting immediately to Lincoln's right is Navy Secretary Gideon Welles, with the president's message in front of him.  The papers on the table in the far right are the Coast Survey's slave population maps that initally guided the work the Blockade Strategy Board. (Image from NOAA archives)


Far from his family in Cambridge, Mass., Commander Charles Davis was finishing his usual Tuesday night dinner with Alexander Dallas Bache at his Capitol Hill residence. It was a troubled time in Washington. In late May 1861, the capital was nearly surrounded by traitors. To the south, Virginia was to vote on secession that week.  The outcome, except in the western counties, was expected to be overwhelmingly in favor of leaving the Old Union.  To the north and east, Maryland was in riot.

There was little comfort in seeing Union volunteers from Massachusetts and New York using the unfinished Capitol as a large barracks and armory. For both men, there was even less comfort in knowing the water approaches -- up the Chesapeake Bay and on the Potomac River -- were well within the range of the large naval guns seized by rebellious shipyard workers in Portsmouth.

With that as backdrop, it was to be one of the most important "private" dinners in the Civil War because it set in a motion a flexible but well thought-out plan that eventually crushed the rebellion.

In the pre-war years when Bache, the superintendent of the Coast Survey, entertained in the survey's drawing rooms, his parties were known for "the quip and the jest." They were remembered as "noctes ambiranae," recalling his days touring Germany with Joseph Henry, now heading the Smithsonian Institution. Davis, a rarity among naval officers then, was educated at Harvard, more an an academic that seagoing war-fighter and extremely comfortable with Bache, the great grandson of Benjamin Franklin.

The West Point-educated Bache, instead of continuing the banter he was known for, outlined his ideas to the head of the Nautical Almanac on how the Union Navy could enforce the president's recently proclaimed blockade.  As matters stood that spring along the 3,500-mile Southern coast, the Confederates were correct in arguing that it was a "paper blockade," not at all interfering with shipping coming in or going out.

Behind closed doors in the survey's spartan offices even before the war broke out, Bache had his cartographers working on two maps -- one of the slaveholding states from Delaware to Texas and the other of virginia -- using 1860 census data to indicate by shading the percentage of slaves in each county.  Bache saw these maps as critical political and military tools, as important to the war effort as the survey's charts of Southern ports and waterways.

In raw form, Bache's ideas complemented those of Lieutenant General Winfield Scott's plan to strange the rebellion from the Atlantic on the east and the Gulf of Mexico in the south and drive westward and southward across land using the inland rivers.  The superintendent, on paper subordinate to the Treasury secretary, then was at the height of his political (coming from a long line of public officials on his mother's side and through marriage) and bureaucratic powers (especially through his close alliance with Henry) as he laid out his plan to "establish a military commission ... to determine military proceedings and operations along the coast."  The good bureaucrat that he was, Bache had already talked with Gustavus Fox, the Navy's ambitious and senior clerk, about systematizing the war effort.

Another month passed before the Blockade Strategy Board actually met at the Navy Department's request.  The first meeting and all that followed were held secretly inside the Smithsonian's castle on the mall, a location conveniently between the War and Navy Departments by the White House and the Coast Survey on Capitol Hill.  Bache was there, as was Davis, now the board's secretary.  Samuel F. DuPont, another close friend of Bache and Davis, also was named to the "secret, important and complex service."  The "military member" was Major John Barnard, an expert in coastal fortifications and a former superintendent of the Military Academy. 

Nothing moved fast in Washington until the Union Army's calamity outside of Manassas Junction July 21.  By then, the board had only completed work on the Atlantic Coast.  Nonetheless Navy Secretary Gideon Welles and Fox called them to the Navy Department to hear the details.  The two senior Navy civilians passed the information onto Lincoln, the rest of the cabinet, and to Scott.

As the summer heated up, the board's straegy was accepted as the best way forward -- even its call for joint operations, a goal rarely met during the Civil War. It also appeared to be the fastest way to win the war.

Welles in his annual report to Congress couldn't say enough good things about the strategy and how it worked at Port Royal and the Outer Banks. It was a lonesome cheery note coming from a cabinet secretary that December.  Even if he knew, he didn't mention the private dinner party talk between two old friends where it was first rolled out in detail.

As for the blockade strategy ensuring quick victory, that turned out to be wishful yearend thinking. 

     

       

The Blockade comes to Florida

I think historians of the Civil War Navies have established that blockade duty was boring, drudgery, tedious, taxing, (fill in your favorite adjective here ___________), and demanding on the ships and sailors who implemented it.

It was also a vital part of the Union war effort. In an earlier post I commented on one of the numerous and myriad “small victories” that the blockade accomplished (12 Oct 2011) by the destruction of the blockade runner Watson off Charleston, SC. Here’s another one.

In the early part of December 1861, Flag Officer DuPont of the South Atlantic Blockading Squadron ordered Commander Charles Steedman of the sidewheel steam gunboat USS Bienville to take up station off St. Simon’s Sound, Georgia. As part of this patrol, Steedman also cruised south to the mouth of the St. Johns River, Florida. On 11 December, the Bienville sighted two blockade runners under sail off the mouth of the river. Her crew captured the pilot schooner Sarah and Caroline, and the other runner was driven ashore. The captured runner carried 60 barrels of turpentine and was evidently bound for Nassau, Bahamas.

The blockade was now officially imposed off the coast of Florida.

NOAA Day at Nauticus and HRNM Report

This past Saturday, the Hampton Roads Naval Museum participated in NOAA Day at Nauticus in Norfolk, VA.  HRNM Educators and Interns conducted two programs for the event, including the debut of the first CWN 150 Educational Program, Blockade: The Anaconda Plan.  We had a lot of positive feedback and results from the event, especially for the new interactive game.  Our plan is to have the program complete by the end of summer, making it available as an instructional CD and lesson plan to any teacher/educator/CWN enthusiast.  Here are some images from the day.


USS Cumberland:  Underwater Archaeology Grid Mapping Activity

Here is the Title Slide for the new CWN 150 program Blockade: The Anaconda Plan

Participants are given choices and follow the game based on their decisions, either as a Confederate Blockade Runner or Union Squadron Commander.

Image of Gameplay:  Patrolling New Inlet at Wilmington.

Visitor participating in the game as a Union Blockade Commander.

From the Quarterdeck: Where 3 choices are given: Only one correct answer.

The Blockade Begins !!

Following President Lincoln's declaration of a blockade of the southern coast on 19 April 1861, the US Navy moved to implement the President's orders. The blockade was initially organized as the Atlantic Blockading Squadron (Flag Officer Silas H. Stringham commanding) and the Gulf Blockading Squadron (Flag Officer William Mervine commanding). Navy warships on foreign stations were recalled, and as they arrived and were refitted, began to take up station on the blockade. The USS Niagara took up station off Charleston, SC on 10 May 1861; about two weeks later, the USS Brooklyn was off the Mississippi River mouth on 26 May. By early July Stringham had 22 warships at his disposal, and Mervine had 21.



The overall blockade strategy was set by the Commission of Conference, also referred to as the Blockade Board, under the chairmanship of Capt. Samuel F. Du Pont. The Board realized that the extensiveness of the coastline of the Confederacy was both blessing and curse. On the one hand, that extensiveness would make effective implementation of the blockade an immense task; at the same time, it would also make it difficult for the Confederacy to defend. The Board conceived of a series of amphibious operations off the Confederate Altlantic and Gulf Coasts to secure bases of operation from which the ships of the Blockade could operate.

Stringham led a squadron of six warships, two army transports and supporting vessels against Hatteras Inlet, NC in August 1861 (more on that when we get to August). The end result of this expedition was the first of many successful US Navy victories along the Confederate coast. Despite this, criticism of Stringham forced his resignation; and the Atlantic Squadron was divided into the North Atlantic Blockading Squadron, under the command of Flag Officer Louis M. Goldsborough, and the South Atlantic Blockading Squadron, under the command of Flag Officer Du Pont. The North Atlantic Squadron was responsible for the coasts of Virginia and N. Carolina, while the South Atlantic Squadron patrolled the coasts of S. Carolina, Georgia, and NE Florida down to Cape Canaveral.

By the beginning of 1862, the Gulf Squadron was similarly divided into the East Gulf Blockading Squadron, responsible for the Florida Coast from Cape Canaveral around to St. Andrew's Bay, and the West Gulf Blockading Squadron, which had the remainder of the Gulf Coast from St. Andrew's Bay to the mouth of the Rio Grande River at the US/Mexico Border. This arrangement remained throughout the rest of the war.

RESOURCES:

Tucker, Spencer C. Blue and Gray Navies. The Civil War Afloat. Annapolis: Naval Institue Press, 2006.

Simson, Jay W. Naval Strategies of the Civil War. Nashville: Cumberland House, 2001.

Any Ship Will Do-The Blockaders

This is an 1861 Harper's Weekly engraving entitled "Preparing Merchant Vessels for the Blockade."  When the Lincoln Administration declared the blockade, the U.S. Navy was desperate for anything that floated to make the blockade proclamation legally binding.  In this particular engraving are ships purchased in New York City: the steamers Augusta, James Adger, Florida, Valley City, Hale, and Star and Stripes and the sail barks Arthur, Brazelero, and Gem of the Seas. 

While not ideal warships, many of this ships already had proven sea keeping traits and did succeed in capturing a few blockade runners during the war.  The Navy equipped most of the vessels with old 32-pounders

The Federal government ability to buy up so many ships demonstrated one of its "advantages" over its Southern opponent.  With ready access to cash, the Federal government was able to buy whatever equipment it needed.

The Stone Fleet

The sinking of the Stone Fleet-Harper's Weekly

On April 19, 1861, President Abraham Lincoln issued his Proclamation of Blockade against Southern Ports, which led to the creation of the Blockade Strategy Board. The Board included four members: Captain Samuel DuPont, Commander Charles Henry Davis, Major John Barnard (of the US Army), and Alexander Bache (from the Smithsonian Institution and US Coast Guard Survey).
Early in the war, one of the Board’s ideas to successfully blockade the South involved using a “Stone Fleet.” As Harpers Weekly reported in December 1861, “The [Stone] fleet is comprised of old whalers, which have been purchased by the Government for the purpose of effectively blockading the Southern ports. By this means the rebels will be frustrated in their little excursions seaward. These ships once in place, no rebel Commissioners will find their way out upon the blue waters to be caught by our gallant naval officers.” So, instead of using active-duty naval vessels to guard the Charleston Harbor, the Board intended to fill these old ships with stones and sink them to keep merchant ships and Confederate Naval Ships from being able to navigate the harbor. This map shows where the 24 whaling ships were sunk.

Ultimately, this attempt to block the harbor was unsuccessful—the ships broke up in a year, and the harbor was never fully blocked and unable to be used. This event inspired Herman Melville to write a poem entitled “The Stone Fleet.” Melville cited his own feelings on the unsuccessful nature of the Stone Fleet in his last two stanzas:

To scuttle them--a pirate deed--
Sack them, and dismast;
They sunk so slow, they died so hard,
But gurgling dropped at last.
Their ghosts in gales repeat
Woe's us, Stone Fleet!

And all for naught. The waters pass--
Currents will have their way;
Nature is nobody's ally; 'tis well;
The harbor is bettered--will stay.
A failure, and complete,Was your Old Stone Fleet.