March 6, 1864: Failed torpedo-boat attack on USS Memphis

The success of the H.L. Hunley on February 17, 1864, even if qualified by the loss of the submarine, gave reason for Confederate authorities at Charleston to attempt more torpedo-craft attacks. The next attempt was not in front of Charleston harbor, but rather to the southwest on the North Edisto River.



Federals had not placed obstructions or taken other measures, as done on the Stono River, to deter Confederate attacks. And the USS Memphis, a former blockade runner herself, operated in the North Edisto. Acting Master Robert O. Patterson commanded the Memphis.



With the Hunley gone, the Confederates employed the CSS David torpedo-boat. The David employed a spar torpedo much like that successfully used on the Hunley. But the David could not submerge, and relied on a low profile to avoid detection during an attack.




In late February the David transited the backwaters to reach Church Flats. On the night of March 4, First Assistant Engineer James H. Tomb skippered the David downriver to within sight of the Memphis. But the torpedo-boat's pumps failed and Tomb abandoned the attack. The following night, Tomb again moved the David downriver. And again the pumps failed. But this time the crew managed to resolve the problem. Tomb then proceeded to attack the Memphis:

About 12:30 a.m. [March 6], as we came within hailing distance, they hailed us, but we paid no attention to their hail, and the next moment they opened on us with small arms, the shot striking the steel cover did no harm. The next moment the "David" struck her on the port quarter about 8 feet below the surface. The blow was a good one, but the torpedo failed to explode.

Patterson reported his men first hailed the David around 1 a.m. as it approached, at a distance of fifty yards.

We immediately beat to quarters and slipped the chain; in an instant the torpedo was under our port quarter, and we could not bring a gun to bear on her. The watch being armed at the time, we were enabled to concentrate a rapid fire with muskets, revolvers, and pistols drawn up on her, and into what looked like a hatchway, nearly in the center; the rapid firing seemed to stop her progress....

Tomb then angled for a second attack:

We then made a turn to port and came back at her, striking her on the starboard quarter. At this time the Memphis was going through the water at good speed and the blow was a glancing one, passing under her counter, taking a portion of our stack away, but the torpedo failed again to explode.

Tomb then turned back upriver, with the Memphis firing on, but not hitting, the David.

When we reached Church Flats and made an examination of the torpedo we found the first blow was a good one, as the tube or cap on that side was mashed perfectly flat, and the glass tube containing the acid was broken, but being a defective tube it failed to explode. The second blow as not a good one, as the tube was slightly bent and the glass tube not broken. The expedition was a failure, caused by a defective tube. The torpedo held 95 pounds of rifle powder.

Captain Francis D. Lee, Chief of Engineers at Charleston and designer of the torpedo used, explained this failure:

As this occurrence may disturb the confidence heretofore felt in the torpedoes prepared by me, I deem it due to myself to state that about ten days since I saw Engineer Tomb, and in the presence of Mr. Theodore Stoney distinctly told him that the torpedo then on the "David" could not be relied upon, it having been exposed for the last six months to every vicissitude of weather and climate.

Lee suggested a new torpedo for the David, but Tomb departed without following up. Thus an opportunity to sink a second Federal steamer during the winter of 1864 eluded the Confederates. In response to the attack, Captain Stephen C. Rowan, then acting commander of the South Atlantic Blockading Squadron, cautioned Patterson to take measures preventing another attack. Those recommendations indicate, as did the precautions ordered by Rear-Admiral John Dahlgren earlier in January, the Federals were well acquainted to the threat:

You will, if practicable, obtain from the shore suitable spars for outriggers, and take your studding sail booms and other spare spars for that purpose. Having prepared your outriggers with 6 or 7 inch hawser, and nets to hang some 8 feet below the surface of the water, you will be protected from torpedo boats, but you must use great vigilance, row guard, and keep your people at or near their guns, giving them rest during the day.

Those simple practices offered countermeasures against the feared spar torpedo in 1864.

(Citations from ORN, Series I, Volume 15, pages 356-9.)

St. Andrews Bay Salt Works Raids Again

Historic marker in a public park in Panama City describing the salt works raids. Author's photo.

In a post in December (December 2013 post), we called attention to a major Union Navy raid on the Confederate salt works in St. Andrews Bay. Because of the critical importance of salt, the Confederates very quickly rebuilt the salt works in St. Andrews Bay after the Union forces departed. The southerners would not give up!  Escaped slaves told Acting Master W.R. Browne of the bark USS Restless about this, and that additional material was being transported down the Wetappo River to build larger works in the Bay. He sent in two parties of his men to again destroy these works. Browne reported on 17 February 1864:

“Learning that the rebels had erected new Government salt works on West Bay, on the site of the old salt works destroyed by us in December, and that they had a force of 50 men armed and stationed there for protection, I fitted out the first cutter, manned with 13 men, under charge of Acting Ensign James J. Russell, with orders to proceed up the Gulf coast 20 miles, and march inland 7 miles to the salt works and attack them in the rear, while Acting Ensign Henry Eason with 10 men, in command of the second cutter, would proceed by the inside passage and attack them in the front at the same time.

The expedition was entirely successful, the works being abandoned upon the appearance of our men, Messrs. Russell’s and Eason’s party joining at the appropriate time, and immediately proceeded in the destruction of everything in the manufactories, consisting of 26 sheet-iron boilers, averaging 881 gallons, and 19 kettles, averaging 200 gallons, making an aggregate of 26,706 gallons, which cost in Montgomery $5.50 per gallon.”

The redoubtable Browne would send in additional raiding parties in March and April 1864. His determination and initiative earned him a promotion to Acting Lieutenant.

More on the Hunley and the Housatonic

As a follow-up to fellow blogger Craig Swain's neat post on the sinking of the USS Housatonic by the submarine CSS Hunley, here is a sketch by Alfred Waud of the event from the Library of Congress archives.

"There being every reason to expect a visit...": Dahlgren's countermeasures against torpedo-boats

Monday marks the 150th anniversary of the sinking of the USS Housatonic by the H.L. Hunley. Rightfully so, the event is mainly remembered as the first successful submarine attack, foreshadowing the weapon's wide spread and significant use in the 20th century. At the same time the Confederates were preparing the H.L. Hunley alongside "David" torpedo boats, the Federal South Atlantic Blockading Squadron prepared and employed some of the first submarine and torpedo-boat countermeasures.

Many of those countermeasures were described in an order from Rear-Admiral John Dahlgren, issued on January 7, 1864:

I have reliable information that the rebels have two torpedo boats ready for service, which may be expected on the first night when the water is suitable for their movement. One of these is the "David," which attacked the Ironsides in October: the other is similar to it.

There is also one of another kind, which is nearly submerged and can be entirely so. It is intended to go under the bottoms of vessels and there operate.

This is believed by my informant to be sure of well working, though from bad management it has hitherto met with accidents, and was laying off Mount Pleasant two nights since.

There being every reason to expect a visit from or all of these torpedoes, the greatest vigilance will be needed to guard against them.

The ironclads must have their fenders rigged out and their own boats in motion about them.

A netting must also be dropped overboard from the ends of the fenders, kept down with shot, and extending along the whole length of the sides; howitzers loaded with canister on the decks and a calcium [light] for each monitor. The tugs and picket boats must be incessantly upon the lookout, when the water is not rough, whether the weather be clear or rainy.

 I observe the ironclads are not anchored so as to be entirely clear of each other's fire if opened suddenly in the dark. This must be corrected, and Captain [Stephen C.] Rowan will assign the monitors suitable positions for this purpose, particularly with reference to his own vessel [USS Ironsides].

It is also advisable not to anchor in the deepest part of the channel, for by not leaving much space between the bottom of the vessel and the bottom of the channel it will be impossible for the diving torpedo to operate except on the sides, and there will be less difficulty in raising a vessel if sunk. 

Nets, patrolling boats, close-range guns, and spotlights - all components used to counter submarines in later conflicts. While convoy formations were not applicable to station-keeping off Charleston, the orders specified a defensive formation designed to repel attacks. In short, a respectable list of anti-submarine measures. Everything save perhaps some depth charges.

Clearly directed to the skippers of the ironclad vessels, which primarily operated in the main ship channel off Morris Island, the orders did not address those ships operating further out from the harbor mouth on blockade duty. This was a miscalculation. One way to look at the sinking of the USS Housatonic, as the Hunley scored the first submarine victory in history, the Federals suffered the first failure to defend against that weapon.  In that light, Dahglren's orders of January 7, 1864 are among the first pages in a long story about countermeasures taken to defeat the submarine.

(Citation from Official records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebellion. ; Series I - Volume 15: South Atlantic Blockading Squadron (October 1, 1863 - September 30, 1864), pages 226-7.)